Monteleone: Addressing the 'Failure' of Informed Consent

ADDRESSING THE 'FAILURE' OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN ONLINE DAT A PROTECTION:
LEARNING THE LESSONS FROM BEHAVIOURAWARE REGULATION
Shara Monteleone
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .................................................................................. 70
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .............................. 71
II. PRIVACY NOTICES AND PRIVACY PARADOX .............. 78
A. Information obligations and informed consent ............. 78

I. Role ofprivacy policies in users' data disclosure ... 81
2. Personal data disclosure: direct and indirect ......... 83
3. Data disclosure between individual autonomy and
legal constraints ...................................................... 83
4. Limitations of the current safeguards: the privacy
paradox ................................................................... 86
B. Addressing the drawbacks: alternative mechanisms to
traditional privacy policies .......................................... 90
I. A legal-technical approach ..................................... 90
2. An integrated behavioural economic approach ...... 95
IIII. INSIGHTS FROM BERAVIOURAL ECONOMICS ON
INFORMATION PROVISION ........................................... 97
A. Applying behavioural science to policy: an overview ... 97
B. Applying behavioural science to policy: challenges and
opportunities ................................................................. 99
C. Applying behavioural science to policy: from information
overload to smart disclosure in Consumer Protection
and in Data Protection ............................................... 103
IV. TOWARDS REGULATED PRIVACYNUDGES? ............ 109
A. Visceral notices ........................................................... 110

t Senior researcher at STeP (Security, Technology & e-Privacy Research Group), European
Technology Law, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
Published by SURFACE, 2015

1

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 4

70

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol.43:1

l. The BREVE experimental project: Behavioural
Responses to Privacy Visceral Notices ................. 112

B. Integrating behavioural insights into privacy policy
making? ...................................................................... 113
1. Future research ..................................................... 117

V. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS .................................................. 118

ABSTRACT
Information notice and data subject's consent are the current main
legal safeguards of data protection and privacy rights: they reflect
individuals' instances, such as self-determination and control over one's
own private sphere, that have been acknowledged in many jurisdictions.
However, the theoretic strength of these safeguards appears frustrated by
current online practices that seem suggesting to give-up with their most
common form of implementation: privacy notices and request for
consent. These measures are proving to be unsuccessful in increasing
users' awareness and in fostering a privacy protective-behaviour. As
recent studies have shown, although people declare privacy concerns,
their actual behaviour diverges from their statements (the "privacy
paradox"), as they seem to increasingly disclose personal data and to not
even read privacy notices available online; eventually, the current privacy
notices are not effective in regulating user's data disclosure.
Behaviourally informed approaches to regulatory problems, already
applied to different areas of information provision and public policy,
helped to clarify the reasons of similar peoples' behaviour that cannot be
reduced to a simplistic "users do not care about privacy." Highlighting
the regulatory weakness of traditional information notices, applied
behavioural science has also demonstrated to be particularly effective in
improving users' decision-making and attaining concrete policy
objectives if accompanied by ad hoc design interventions to display the
relevant, salient information. As users do not read privacy policies or act
in contradiction with them, other strategies might be more successful in
promoting, "nudging," privacy-protective behaviour.
The use of innovative information notices, like salient alerts and
nudges, seems to be a promising means of behavioural change also in the
area of digital privacy, a possible new area of application of behavioural
insights.
Building on recent studies in the field (conducted mainly in the
U.S.), this paper considers new forms of privacy notices (like "visceral"
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol43/iss1/4
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notices), as alternative or complement to current legal (technical)
measures for data protection. For the informed consent approach (or
"notice and choice" approach) to work, it needs to be improved with welldesigned, transparent and regulated nudging system, capable to help
citizens in their decision-making as regards their privacy.
Without disregarding the challenges and limitations of nudging
strategies in public policy in general and in the privacy area in particular,
and examining their legal grounds, the paper aims also to integrate that
branch of legal-policy research that see "nudging" methods as an
effective way to gently encourage safer behaviours in the citizens.

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The emergence of new digital technologies and the growth of an
information-based economy, made data protection policy a priority in the
European Union ("EU"), as well as in other countries' agenda, in which
the search for a balance between the safeguard of individual fundamental
rights and other competing interests is deemed crucial for the same
Information Communication
existence of a democratic society.
Technologies ("ICTs"), despite being a key enabler for economic
development, may also represent a threat to fundamental rights, namely
to privacy and data protection rights, as enshrined by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU. 1
Safeguarding these rights plays a central role in building trust in the
online environment. As the European Commission pointed out, building
this trust is essential to economic development, 2 and it is a key objective
in the Digital Agenda for Europe ("DAE"), the EU flagship initiative on
all ICT-related activities. 3 For these reasons, the current legal framework
1. See Charter ofFundamental Rights of the European Union 326/02, art. 7-8, 2012 O.J.
(C 391) 2 (containing two separate articles for privacy and data protection rights).
2. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 1, COM (2012) 11 final
(Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal for GDPR].
3. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A Digital
Agenda/or Europe, at 13, COM (2010) 245 final (May 19, 2010). The DAE, which includes
more than 100 distinct actions, has as one of its goals to reinforce trust and security online.
Action 35, in particular, aims to provide guidance in implementation of new Telecoms
framework with regard to the protection of individuals' privacy and personal data (namely, of
thee-privacy Directive 2002/58/EC as modified by Directive 2009/136/EC). See Action 35:
Guidance on Implementation of Telecoms Rules and Privacy, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct.
25, 2010), available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/pillar-iii-trust-security/action35-guidance-implementation-telecoms-rules-privacy (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). Action 35
has to be read in conjunction with Action 12 (Review of the European Data Protection Rules)
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on privacy and data protection in Europe is under review; 4 Directive
95/46/EC is going to be replaced by the General Data Protection
Regulation ("GDPR"), which aims "to build a stronger and more coherent
data protection framework in the EU." 5
One of the main safeguards of the EU legal framework that the
Proposal for a GDPR seeks to reinforce is represented by the fair
information principles; 6 the transparency principle and consequent
information obligations for those who process personal data is now
strengthened and codified in the Draft Regulation, as a reinforcement of
individual rights protection and an instrument of user empowerment. 7
In particular, "Article 11 introduces the obligation on controllers to
provide transparent and easily accessible and understandable

aimed at reviewing the current Data Protection regulatory framework "to strengthen
individual rights and tackle emerging challenges from globalisation and new technologies."
EUROPEAN UNION: CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS HANDBOOK: VOLUME ]
STRATEGIC INFORMATION AND REGULATIONS 64, 73 (2014).
4. The legal framework currently applicable in the field of privacy and data protection
is represented mainly by the Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing ofpersonal data and on the free movement of such data, integrated by the
Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector (so called e-Privacy Directive, as modified
by the Directive 2009/136/EC, the e-cookies Directive). See Council Directive 95/46, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); Council Directive 2002/58, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC); Council
Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11 (EC).
5. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 2. The regulation, will apply to public and
private processing of personal data in most of the activities related to the former I pillar of EU
(the community pillar, including single market, consumer protection, social policy, etc.). The
European Commission has a parallel initiative for the data protection in the area of police and
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data by Competent Authorities for the Purposes of Prevention,
Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal
Penalties, and the Free Movement ofSuch Data, at 15, COM (2012) 10 final (Jan. 25, 2012).
Despite the adoption of these two separate legal instruments for data protection in different
areas, given that the Lisbon Treaty (2009) has abolished the Pillar structure, the EC is firmly
striving to adopt a comprehensive approach on data protection. See Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions: A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection
in the European Union, at 409, COM (2010) 609 final (Apr. 11, 2010) [hereinafter A
Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection].
6. See Paul De Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, The Proposed Data Protection
Regulation Replacing Directive 95/45/EC: A Sound System for the Protection of Individuals,
28 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 130, 134 (2012).
7. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 25 ("The principles of fair and transparent
processing require that the data subject should be informed in particular of the existence of
the processing operation and its purposes, how long the data will be likely stored, on the
existence of the right of access, rectification or erasure and on the right to lodge a
complaint.").
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information. " 8 This is particularly relevant in situations such as online
advertising, where the proliferation of actors and the technological
complexity of practices make it difficult for the data subject to know and
understand if personal data relating to them are being collected, by whom
and for what purpose. 9 "Article 14 further specifies the controller's
information obligations towards the data subject." 10
This means that according to the transparency principle of the
European legislation, any data controller, including an Internet company
or an Internet Service Provider, must specify the types of data collected
and the purposes for which they may be used.
Data processing and data flow are thus allowed under a number of
conditions, namely the requirement of obtaining data subject's consent
that should be free, specific and informed.
Directly connected to the transparency principle and information
obligations, the informed (and also free and specific) consent requirement
represents a cornerstone of the EU data protection legislation: it grants
the main legal ground for personal data processing (although other legal
basis are contemplated) 11 and it has been strengthened by the Draft
GDPR, becoming now an explicit consent 12 requirement.

8. Id. at 8.
9. See id. at 43 ("Personal data must be: (a) processed lawfully, fairly and in a
transparent manner in relation to the data subject."); id. at 47 ("I. The controller shall have
transparent and easily accessible policies with regard to the processing of personal data and
for the exercise of data subjects' rights. 2. The controller shall provide any information and
any communication relating to the processing of personal data to the data subject in an
intelligible form, using clear and plain language, adapted to the data subject, in particular for
any information addressed specifically to a child.") (emphasis added); see also id. at 24
(urging, in particular for children, specific protection and a clear language).
l 0. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 8 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 43-44.
1. Processing of personal data shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one
of the following applies:
(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of their personal data for one
or more specific purposes;
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject
is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into
a contract ....
Id.
12. See id. at 42 ("'[T]he data subject's consent' means any freely given specific,
informed and explicit indication of his or her wishes by which the data subject, either by a
statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to personal data relating to
them being processed.") (emphasis added). The need to examine ways to clarify and
strengthen the consent requirement has been considered by the European Commission. See
A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection, supra note 5, at 8-9.
[I]n the online environment - given the opacity of privacy policies - it is often
more difficult for individuals to be aware of their rights and give informed
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It is understood that consent cannot be inferred implicitly, as
inaction should not be perceived as the indication of users' wishes, and
that it should be evidenced by a statement or by a clear affirmative action.
This last aspect is particularly relevant for the online environment, 13
where user's inactivity cannot be considered as consent, but where a
"click" might be accepted as valid consent (if all other conditions are
met). 14
This means that in the context of behavioural advertising (which is
becoming the principal business model for companies in the digital
economy), the informed consent requirement should be obtained, for
instance, by the third-party advertisers tracking the users, before placing
tracking cookies on a user's computer or before accessing information
stored on the user's computer. For the consent to be informed, the user
should be provided with information about, for instance, the sending and
purposes of the cookies. 15
The choice made by the European legislation is clearly for an opt-in
system, where an active action to consent is required (as opposed to optout system where the consent is presumed by default, with the possibility
for the user to change it). 16
consent. This is even more complicated by the fact that, in some cases, it is not
even clear what would constitute freely given, specific and informed consent to
data processing ...

Id. at 9.
13. In this regard, it is important to notice that European Directive 2002/58/EC, the
distinct directive for the protection of personal data in the electronic communications sector
(i.e., thee-Privacy Directive) as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC, also requires companies
to obtain the Internet users' consent, in particular before installing cookies, having the users
been provided with clear and comprehensive information . See Council Directive 2002/58,
art. 5, 2002 OJ. (L 201) 37 (EC). The relationship between the Draft General DP Regulation
and thee-Privacy Directive still needs to be clarified, however thee-Privacy Directive does
not seem affected by the reform (if not for technical adjustments) and it should work as lex
specialis with respect to the General Regulation. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at
99.
14. See Council Directive 2002/58 2002 OJ. (L 201) 31 (EC) ("Consent may be given
by any appropriate method enabling a freely given specific and informed indication of the
user's wishes, including by ticking a box when visiting an Internet website."); see also
Opinion of the Working Parking on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data on the "Definition of Consent," at 26 (July 13, 2011), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp 187_ en.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Opinion on the Definition of Consent].
15. Council Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J (L 337) 11 (EC). According to Recital 66 of
Directive 2009/136/EC, modifying e-Privacy Directive "methods of providing information
and offering the right to refuse should be as user-friendly as possible" and that, "[w]here it is
technically possible and effective, the user's consent to processing may be expressed by using
the appropriate settings of a browser or other application." Id. (emphasis added); see Opinion
on the Definition of Consent, supra note 14, at 32.
16. See, e.g., id.
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Now, it must be noticed that both the current Data Protection ("DP")
Directives and the Draft Regulation, despite establishing those
information obligations and consent requirements, contain few
indications on how information should be provided to the user or how the
latter could exercise her right to object to the processing of personal data.
The common instruments usually adopted by data controllers to be
compliant with the law are privacy policies (or notices). 17
As studies conducted both in Europe 18 and outside Europe 19 have
shown, the problem with current privacy polices is that they are not
effective, at least not concerning the purpose of increasing users privacy
awareness (risks and rights) nor of encouraging a more responsible data
disclosure. These and similar studies, 20 in fact, have demonstrated that,
although the majority of Internet users report to have concerns about
privacy and to notice the presence of privacy notices or warning
messages, most of them, especially young people, do not read these
statements and keep disclosing personal data: this phenomenon is also
called "privacy paradox."
Current privacy notices are ignored as they are often written in a not
clear and easy language. In brief, they are hardly ever read by users and
- even if read - very difficult to understand. The reality offers a scenario
characterized by a lack of understanding by users of the ways personal
data is collected, used and disclosed, as well as of potential risks with the
consequence that the provision of users' consent is not really informed.
However, even when the level of clearness and completeness of
privacy polices is satisfactory, i.e., when they fulfill the legal formal
17. Most common privacy notices attached to a webpage are usually accessible through
a hyperlink and made of a long statement; they are supposed to explain what information is
collected and for what purposes, how it is used and the choices offered to the users (e.g. how
to update personal account or to modify the default settings). Some examples, taken from
Ryanair and Google's websites, are provided here: see, e.g., Ryanair Website Privacy
Statement, RY AN AIR, available at http://www.ryanair.com/ie/privacy-policy/ (last visited
at
available
GOOGLE,
Policy,
Privacy
2015);
18,
Dec.
http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google .com/it!/inti/enGB/po licies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en-GB.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
18. See, e.g., Pan-European Survey of Practices, Attitudes & Policy Preferences as
Regard Personal Identity Data Management, JOINT RES. CTR. (2012), available at
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pagesffFS/documents/EIDSURVEY_Web_001.pdf (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015) [hereinafter Pan-European Survey ofPractices].
19. See, e.g., Janice Tsai et al., What's it to you? A Survey of Online Privacy Concerns
and Risks (NET Institute, Working Paper No. 06-29, 2006); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie
Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 J. L. & PoL'Y FOR THE INFO. Soc'v 543
(2008).
20. Mary Madden et al., Teen, Social Media and Privacy Report, PEW RES. CTR. (May
21, 2013 ), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/2013/05/21 /teens-social-media-andprivacy/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
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requirements, they fail to realize the main purpose of the law ( at least of
the European law), that is, to foster attentive users' decision-making and
eventually a conscious data-disclosure behaviour.
As users do not read privacy policies or act in contradiction with
them, other strategies might be more successful in obtaining privacyprotective behaviour. It is not enough that privacy policies are provided
in a place easy to find on a website, but they also should have an impact
on users' behaviour.
Providing simplified, standardized privacy information, although of
some benefits, has proved to be also insufficient. Insights from
behavioural economics have helped to understand why (as discussed in
the next sections).
Finally, current privacy policies do not help users in making the best
choices as regards to consent (or not) to data processing. They fail to
realize one of the objectives of DP law, i.e., to ensure that people make
pondered decisions about their data, and, as ultimate goal, to increase
trust in online services. Therefore, there may be a need of policy
intervention aimed at changing users' behaviour, introducing alternative,
more effective ways of presenting information.
Knowing how users really behave with regard to their personal data
(often in contrast with their statements) may play a relevant role in
addressing the current "privacy paradox," as well as the gap between
existing legal privacy safeguards and implementing tools.
Behavioural research has not only shown that there is a significant
relationship between the content of privacy policies and individuals'
privacy concems/trust, 21 but also that an overload of information (e.g.,
long and complex texts) is counterproductive also in the privacy field. 22
Given that people are influenced by how information (on products,
services, etc.) is presented, identifying the appropriate notice content and
design to display online privacy information should also improve users'
decision-making in this regard, helping them in attaining a greater
empowerment online. 23 By making easier, agile and thus more effective
the display of privacy information, in fact, users may be able to take more

21. Kuang-Wen Wu et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Policy on Consumer Privacy
Concern and Trust, 28 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEH. 889 (2012).
22. See, e.g., Janice Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing
Behaviour: An Experimental Study, 22 INFO. SYSTEM RES. 254 (2011); Alessandro Acquisti
& Jens Grossklags, What Can Behaviorual Economics Teach Us About Privacy, in DIGITAL
PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 363 (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2007).
23. See generally Sebastian Deterding et al. , Designing Gamijication: Creating Gameful
and Playful Experiences, in CHI '13 CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS 3263 (2013).
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informed decisions regarding the usage of their personal information
online. 24
Experiments to test users' responses (their actual behaviour) to new
type of privacy policies started to be run mainly in the U.S., 25 while in
Europe this aspect is still not enough explored. This paper gives briefly
an account of the existing behavioural studies and experiments,
including, though, the first steps undertaken by the EU in this direction:
BREVE (Behavioural Responses to Privacy Visceral Notices), a project
recently launched by the European Commission, aims at studying the
impact of different, innovative online privacy notices on users' behaviour
as regards their privacy. The aim is to encourage also in Europe the use
of behavioural research for policy making in the field of privacy.
In light of the above, this article is structured as follows: Part II
briefly recalls the main findings of the current research on privacy
policies and informed consent requirements as (ineffective) legal tools
for privacy protection also in comparison with other information
disclosure mechanisms (e.g., in consumer protection contexts). The
starting point will be the analysis of the phenomenon called the "privacy
paradox." Having learned the lessons from previous studies and
experiments on users' practices online, Part III discusses the challenges
and opportunities of behavioural sciences applied to public policy in
order to better understand the relevance of behavioural aspects in the
privacy area. The focus will be, eventually, on privacy information
provisions and users' data disclosure behaviour, with particular emphasis
on recent research conducted on Privacy Visceral Notices. Part IV,
finally, provides some recommendations on how to integrate Behavioural
Insights into privacy policy and law (hard law and/or soft law) and on
future research. In this way, this paper seeks also to integrate that
research strand that explores to what extent (and at what level of
governance) the regulatory approach could play a role in cyberspace. 26

24. Laura Brandimarte et al., Misplaced Confidences: Privacy and the Control Paradox,
& PERSONALITY Sci. 40, 41-45 (2013).
25. See, e.g., Victoria Groom & M. Ryan Calo, Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An
Experimental Study 1 passim (Social Science Research Network, Working Paper, 2011)
(experimental study on the efficacy of various techniques ofnonlinguistic notice on consumer
privacy expectations); Yang Wang et al., A Field Trial of Privacy Nudges for Face book, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS
2367 (2014) (reporting the results of an experiment conducted on U.S. students, users of
Facebook and exposed to different privacy nudges, ranging from a "time nudge" to the
"emotional nudge").
26. See generally Oreste Pollicino & Marco Bassini, Internet Law in the Era of
Transnational Law (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper No. 24
(2011).
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II. PRIVACY NOTICES AND PRIVACY PARADOX
A. Information obligations and informed consent
"Confidence in the Internet and its governance is a prerequisite for
the realization of the Internet's potential as an engine for economic
growth and innovation. . . . The [European] Commission is addressing
these challenges, notably via the reform of the EU Data Protection
framework. 27
The Draft GDPR, to which this reform has been assigned,
strengthens the consent requirement and the transparency principle, as
said in the introduction: "The controller shall have transparent and easily
accessible policies."28 This information disclosure obligation is imposed
by the European legislator to any data controller, 29 including Internet
companies/ISPs: they should provide complete and accurate information
regarding purposes, nature, conditions of online data processing and
users' privacy rights, so that the subjects can provide an "aware"
consent. 30

27. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Internet Policy
and Governance: Europe's Role in Shaping the Future of Internet Governance, at 9, COM
(2014) 72 final (Feb. 12, 2014) (EC).
28. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 47.
29. Data controller "determines the purposes, conditions and means of the processing of
personal data," as far as there purposes are legitimate. See id. at 41-42.
30. The consent to data processing that the data subject might decide to give should refer
also to the purposes for which personal data are processing. In the EU legislation, in fact, the
consent is conceived as a major instrument for individuals to keep control over the processing
(and the purposes) of their data. This also explains the relevance of the notion of free and
specific consent as well as of 'further purposes' for which data might be processed.
Interestingly, while the current Directive 95/46 states that data cannot be further processed in
a way incompatible with the purposes for which they have been collected (Art 6), the Draft
Regulation introduces a more permissible criterion. Further processing is allowed where the
purposes are compatible with those for which the data have been collected (Art 6): i.e. in case
of further processing, subject's consent is required only in case of incompatibility of the
further purposes. Internet companies certainly receive advantage from this amendment, as
they will not need to ask for consent in many ' compatible' cases. The purposes limitation
principle has its equivalent in the North American privacy literature in the concept of
'contextual integrity' and possibly in its regulation as one of the principles of what will be the
first U.S. general privacy Act. See Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy
Online, 140 J. AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & Set. 32, 37 (2011); see also EXEC. OFFIC E OF TH E
PRESIDENT, CONSUM ER DATA PRIVACY fN A NETWORKED WORLD : A

FRAMEWORK FOR

PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTfNG INNOVATION IN TH E GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY

(2012). Although it does not seem to add anything new to the European legal framework, the
context integrity principle could be a useful, interpretive instrument also for the application
of the EU Draft DP Regulation, e.g. defining the limits of data processing for further purposes,
and thus, the scope of the consent, especially online. See Kristina Irion & Giacomo Luchetta,

Online Personal Data Processing and EU Data Protection Reform, CEPS TASK FORCE REP.
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The traditional way to fulfill this obligation online is the provision
of privacy notices (or policies). More precisely, privacy notices are
statements that should help data subjects to understand how data
controllers will use their personal data, providing them with detailed
information about what, why and how personal data will be collected,
processed, stored, used and in cases, disclosed. These notices should also
provide information about the data subjects' rights (e.g., to access their
personal data) and the security measures adopted for its safe treatment.
The final goal would be to confer individuals with control over their
personal data and, through this control, to allow them to decide for
themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits of the disclosure of their
data: this approach is also called "self-management privacy." 31
These privacy notices have been gradually introduced as
implementation of mandatory regulation (that is the rule in the EU) or
adopted as self-regulation practices by businesses in response to privacy
concerns (that is the rule in the U.S.). 32 Criticisms to the self-regulation
model of privacy policies, in particular in the U.S., point out the fact that
this model has allowed a sectorial and weak approach to privacy 33 all in
favor of business interests. With a proliferation of privacy policies not
accompanied by substantial safeguards, individual protection would have
become more an appearance of privacy than a reality: users may believe
they have more privacy simply because a website has a privacy policy, 34
or they are presumed to be consenting to a website's privacy conditions

CEPS Digital FORUM (2013), available at http://www.ceps.eu/publications/online-personaldata-processing-and-eu-data-protection-reform (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
31. Daniel Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L.
R EV. 1879, 1882 (2013).
32. While in the EU information obligations for companies and governmental entities
dealing with data processing stem from general privacy legislations, at both supranational and
national level, in the U.S. sectorial regulations and a self-regulation model prevail, as a federal
legislation is missing and a State legislation on privacy is exceptional. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE§§ 22575-79 (West 2015). For an overview on the increasing privacy concerns
in U.S. (from 43% in the 1990 to 88% in 2003) and for a critical assessment of privacy policies
use by companies see generally Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting
Away Control Over Personal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. Rev. 587, 592, 624 (2007)
(claiming that U.S. privacy policies, far from being an instrument of protection, have become
one more adhesion contract for individuals to avoid, the enforcement of which might be
challenged by individuals at least for "(1) a lack of assent, as many online privacy policies
still employ browse-wrap acceptance features; and (2) unconscionability of terms"). See also
Chris J. Hoofnagle et al. , How Different are Young Adults from Older Adults When it Comes
to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 20 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the U.C. Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley Center for Law and Technology).
33. Daniel Solove & Chris J. Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 357, 365-66 (2006).
34. Haynes, supra note 32, at 610.
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simply because they are visiting that website and using its services. 35
In Europe, the adoption of privacy policies derives from the
implementation of general Data Protection principles and rules (mainly,
fairness and information obligations). However, traditional privacy
policies (or notices) are criticized also in Europe as they proved to be
insufficient to realize the purposes of data protection. Despite the
theoretical value of privacy policies, the efficacy of current notice and
consent mechanisms is increasingly questioned in the privacy area, 36 as
well as in other areas, so much that someone has defined certain
criticisms, at times excessive, "notice skepticism." 37
Traditional privacy policies tend to be written, detailed and usually
long and highly complex texts; in online environments, they consist of
separate texts hardly accessible or displayed in a slightly visible part of a
website. Internet users are asked to consent to the conditions described
in the privacy policies by ticking a "yes" box at the end of the statements;
more often, this box is simply positioned beside a link (hyperlink), which
refers to another page (hypertext) containing the privacy policy: clicking
the box presumes you have read the policies.
Users are supposed to read these texts, understand them and give
their informed consent to the processing of their personal data along the
lines explained in the privacy policies. Nevertheless, this assumption
is-most of the time-flawed, as data-subjects tend to merely scroll
down the privacy policies and rush for the tick box (or simply tick the
box without even following the link).
By providing these textual information notices, however, data
controllers comply, at least formally, with their information obligations.
Like for other disclosure obligations (e.g., on products and services

35. For an overview on advantages and disadvantages of privacy ("Having too much
privacy can be as bad as having too little") see Lior J. Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory
of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV . 2010, 2010, 2039, 2041 (2013), who talks of distributive
effects of privacy (it benefits some people and damaged others) and urges, also for the U.S.,
a more proactive and non-sectorial way to protect privacy.
36. See Brendan Van Alsenoy et al., Privacy Notices Versus Informational SelfDetermination: Minding the Gap, 28 INT. REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 185 (2014); Brendan
Van Alsenoy & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy-Friendly 'Model' Privacy Policies, SECURITY
AND
PRIVACY
FOR
ONLINE
Soc.
NETWORKS
(2013),
available
at
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/453694/1 /SPI0N_ D9 .3 .5 _Privacy_ friendly_
model_privacy_policies.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); see also Alessandro Mantelero, The
Future of Consumer Data Protection in the E. U. Re-thinking the "Notice and Consent"
Paradigm in the New Era of Predictive Analytics, 30 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 643
(2014).
37. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REY. 1027, 1055-57 (2012).
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quality as set in the Consumer Protection regulation 38 ), in fact, the
European data protection law does not specify the format that this
information to be provided to the users should have 39 ( or provides only
few indications). This means that, as far as the information provision
obligations are satisfied, i.e., the minimum of information required by
data protection rules has been provided, the controller is free to choose
the way to provide this information, regardless of its effectiveness.

1. Role ofprivacy policies in users' data disclosure
The role of privacy policies should be also to enable in the users a
cautious and aware willingness to disclose personal data. 40 Under an
economic perspective, willingness to disclose personal data might be
beneficial for companies (increasingly relying on an information-based
business model) and, to some extent, also for the users, who might have
personalized, higher quality services and relevant promotions. 41 It would
be about striking a balance between obtaining advantages of targeted
services and keeping control over their own personal data. According to
the neoclassic economic view of privacy, individuals would "rationally"
trade off their short term benefits (e.g., targeted services) and long terms
costs of data disclosure (e.g., risks of privacy invasion), being able to
make a pondered decision.
Some scholars have shown the relationship between the content of
privacy policies and the users' intention to interact with websites where
there is a requirement to provide personal data. 42 Privacy concerns seem
to have a negative impact on the willingness to provide personal
information, while trust seems to have a positive impact. However, if
people see benefits of disclosure (like personalized services in ecommerce or entertainment in social networks) as outweighing the
concerns for privacy risks, they would be more likely to disclose. Given
that willingness to provide personal data online is closely related to
privacy concerns, a way to reduce these concerns would be to provide
them with good privacy policies, i.e., with really informative policies,
increasing users' awareness and reassuring them about possible risks: 43
the information would be able to reduce privacy concerns and to increase
38. Consumer protection in Europe is now enshrined in the European Directive on
Consumer Rights 2011/83/EC. See Council Directive 2011/83, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64 (EU).
39. Some indications, however, have been offered by the Opinion on the Definition of
Consent, supra note 14, at 26.
40. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 8, 25.
41. Wu et al., supra note 21, at 890.
42. Id. at 891.
43. Id.
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trust in websites. In other words, using privacy policies, which clearly
inform users about how companies treat their data and which are read by
users, according to Wu et al., would not only reduce their concerns and
increase trust, but it would meanwhile increase users' willingness to
disclose personal information. 44
However, things seem more complicated than they have just been
pictured; reducing privacy concerns through complete information is not
enough to increase trust. Other studies have shown, in fact, that often the
greater the privacy reassurances provided to individuals, the greater their
reluctance to reveal personal information because the strong privacy
reassurance primes the individuals about the sensitivity of their data. 45
Moreover, it does not guarantee a safe digital environment for
individuals, to whom a cautious, responsible behaviour is required
(regardless of the duly supervisory role of regulatory authorities). Risks
of privacy violation, illicit data practices or violations of correlated rights
(e.g., to non-discrimination, etc.) deriving from the increasing reliance on
Big Data became a worrying reality in the digital era. 46 Education and
good information are certainly important but demonstrated not to
suffice. 47 Therefore, restrictive legal intervention is sometime deemed
necessary to protect the data-subject, usually the weakest party in online
and offline relationships.
In the attempt to curb the risks for data protection (and related
concerns) arising from the massive use of digital technologies, the EU
Draft DP Regulation not only strengthens some of the existing
safeguards-like the information obligations for data controllers-but
also reaffirms the principle of minimization of data collection and
processing. 48 On the one hand, personal data collection by public and
private entities is not forbidden by the EU law, but regulated and
structured; on the other, personal data disclosure by users is not
44. Wu, supra note 21 .
45. Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of
Privacy: 30 Years after the OECD Privacy Guidelines 13 (Working Party for Info. Security
& Privacy & Working Party on Info. Econ., Background Paper No. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46968784.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
46. See, e.g., Opinion ofthe Working Party on the Protection ofIndividuals with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data on "Purpose Limitation" (Apr. 2, 2013), available at
http://idpc.gov.mt/dbfile.aspx/Opinion3_2013 .pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); Jules
Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data: Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. 25
(2013).
47. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 32, at 20.
48. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 22. "The data should be adequate, relevant
and limited to the minimum necessary for the purposes for which the data are processed; this
requires in particular ensuring that the data collected are not excessive and that the period for
which the data are stored is limited to a strict minimum." Id. (emphasis added).
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discouraged, yet driven to be more aware and wise.
2. Personal data disclosure: direct and indirect
It is important to stress that personal data disclosure (and its specular
activity, data collection) might occur inadvertently, especially online,
where most of people's daily activities are nowadays performed. During
their browsing, people leave continuous traces of their behaviour, private
lives and preferences without being asked, or without being aware. Data
disclosure, in fact, might be direct, i.e., on a voluntary basis (like in the
cases of filling in an online form) and indirect, as a result from other
online activities (web browsing, location moving, click stream, etc.). 49
The latter kind of data disclosure/data collection may create more
concerns as it may occur unobtrusively, out of users' control. Most of
the time, the two kinds of data collection are also combined: data
collected "indirectly" might be matched with data of direct disclosure,
allowing companies or public organizations to have a complete profile of
people.
Wide literature exists about the several issues raised by profiling
techniques 50 and by the "hidden" collection of data, not least the fear of
mass surveillance 51 and users' manipulation. Now, the problem is that
against this indirect disclosure, traditional privacy notices have very little
or any effect at all. 52
3. Data disclosure between individual autonomy and legal constraints.

In certain cases, the individual's autonomy to choose whether or not
to disclose their data is restricted by the law intervention, regardless of
users' informed consent, because it is presumed not freely given, not
genuine and therefore not valid. 53 Some privacy risks are deemed so
49. See generally Groom & Calo, supra note 25.
50. See generally PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN: CROSS-DISCIPLINE PERSPECTIVES
(Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth eds., 2008). The Draft GDPR takes into account new
scenarios, acknowledging the existing practices ofusers profiling as new business models for
companies but also introducing specific limitations to them.
51. See, e.g., Roger Clarke, Profiling: A Hidden Challenge to the Regulation of Data
Surveillance, 4 J.L. & INFO. Sci. 403 (1993); Roger Clarke, Information Technology and
Dataveillance, 21 COMM. OF THE ACM 498 (1988).
52. See generally Groom & Calo, supra note 25.
53. The EU law intervenes to prohibit the collection and processing of special categories
of data, even in the presence of individual's consent and when the conditions do not allow the
individual to "freely" choose to consent. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 22. "In
order to ensure free consent, it should be clarified that consent does not provide a valid legal
ground where the individual has no genuine and free choice and is subsequently not able to
refuse or withdraw consent without detriment." Id. (emphasis added).
Consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data,
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serious by the EU legislation to foresee a strong protection especially for
weaker categories of people. 54
This limitation to individual autonomy, especially in contractual
context, which might appear an excess of paternalism, can be explained
by the status of data protection and privacy as fundamental rights.55 This
approach has been strengthened with the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon in December 2009 that gave to the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of7 December 2000 ("CFR") a binding force of primary law in the EU. 56
Pursuing the economic development (also) by fostering the free flow
of personal data, the European DP law aims at the "protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data." 57 Privacy and
data protection is understood in Europe as not only an individual right,
but also as a public interest, a conditio sine qua non for a democratic
society, a liberty rather than a freedom: 58 essential to guarantee the right
to self-determination, it would ensure other rights, like freedom of
expression, enable diversity and prevent undue societal control. 59
where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller. This is
especially the case where the data subject is in a situation of dependence from the
controller, among others, where personal data are processed by the employer of
employees ' personal data in the employment context. Where the controller is a public
authority, there would be an imbalance only in the specific data processing operations
where the public authority can impose an obligation by virtue of its relevant public
powers and the consent cannot be deemed as freely given, taking into account the
interest of the data subject.

Id.
54. See id. at 45. Article 8 sets out further conditions for the lawfulness of the processing
of personal data of children in relation to information society services offered directly to them.
55. On a discussion on the private law approach to personal data protection see generally
Nadezhda Purtova, Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship to
Privacy and Waiver of Data Protection Rights, 28 N ETH. Q. HUM. RTs ., 179 (2010).
56. As recalled above, the Charter contains two separate articles for privacy right and
for data protection rights. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7-8,
Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 326) 1. Moreover, article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the EU provides now the legal basis for any piece of legislation adopted by the EU on data
protection. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 16, May 9, 2008 , 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 55.
57. See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC); see also Proposal for
GDPR , supra note 2, at 2.
It is time to build a stronger and more coherent data protection framework in the EU,
backed by strong enforcement that will allow the digital economy to develop across
the internal market, put individuals in control of their own data and reinforce legal
and practical certainty for economic operators and public authorities.
Id.
58. See generally Antoinette Rouvroy & Yves Pullet, The Right to Informational SelfDetermination and the Value ofSelf-Development: Reassessing the Importance ofPrivacy for
Democracy, in REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 45 (Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2009).
59. See generally Mireille Hildebrandt & Bert-Jaap Koops, The Challenges of Ambient
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Although many times the two statuses overlap, the concept of data subject
or user does not coincide necessarily with that of the consumer, 60 as well
as the European DP law is not a consumer protection law. 61
Legal public intervention and supervision mechanisms in favor of
individuals' privacy, which might take place regardless of the interested
subject's consent to data processing, are not rare in Europe, and are aimed
at verifying that other legal grounds (e.g., necessity, proportionality)
occur: this is not only to overcome the limitations of a merely selfregulating approach to privacy, 62 but also to guarantee the same existence
of democratic processes. 63
This public intervention, foreseen by the sui generis EU Data
Protection law64 to protect the individual's rights, may occur to limit
market practices that might jeopardize individuals' rights. The regulatory
intervention may take place by imposing information disclosure
requirements to companies that collect data, as well as conditions and
limitations to the validity of a subject's consent (presumed not valid in
cases of children or in cases of unbalanced decisional powers in the
employment area). 65 It is also reflected in the decisional, monitoring and

Law and Legal Protection in the Profiling Era, 73 MOD. L. REV. 428 (20 I 0).
60. For considerations on the consequences of this approach on the legal nature of data
subject consent, as unilateral act, like an authorization rather than as a contractual agreement,
see Daniel Le Metayer & Shara Monteleone, Automated Consent Through Privacy Agents:
Legal Requirements and Technical Architecture, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 136, 138
(2008). The issue, however, is debated in literature, reflecting two different approaches to
Data Protection mainly embraced in EU the first, mostly followed in U.S., the second.
61 . See Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 21-22. This Report also stresses the
difference between DP and consumer protection, which refers to a cross-cutting EU policy
field that aims at enhancing the positions of consumers of product and services; however,
according to Irion & Luchetta (CEPS)'s Report, consumer protection regulation when
modifies contract law to the benefit of the consumer ( e.g. regarding unfair terms and practices)
would depart from the party autonomy principle, while DP framework would strongly
emphasizes the control and autonomy of individual through the instrument of consent.
Although I fully share the view of consent as enabling individual to control over her data, I
would stress the idea that the European DP regulation contains as much limitations to
individual autonomy, deemed necessary for protecting a fundamental right like data
protection that is also an essential public interest. First because the consent does not legitimize
every type of data processing and also because the interest of data subject is at the center of
the European legal framework (even more in the ongoing reform) so much that the protection
of his data and private sphere may be acknowledged and granted despite his consent to data
collection and regardless of whether he issued a complaint or not. See generally Le Metayer
& Monteleone, supra note 60.
62. Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 33, at 385.
63. See, e.g., Rouvroy & Poullet, supra note 58; Julie E. Cohen, Privacy and
Technology: What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1912 (2013).
64. Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 22.
65. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, 43-45.
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sanctioning powers granted by the EU law to DP national authorities. 66
The latter could intervene, even ex officio (i.e., without a formal claim by
the interested subject) to adopt the needed legal measures, aimed at
preventing, forbidding data processing detrimental for individual rights
or remedying its consequences. 67
This rights-based approach is also reflected in the recent case law of
the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") 68 and seems confirmed by the
Draft GDPR; conditions and bans on the use of personal data have been
strengthened, at the risk of being considered paternalistic. However, a
defensive approach to data protection and privacy rights does not need to
be also too rigidly paternalistic.
As discussed below, a different, "soft" perspective seems possible,
as well as an evolving interpretation of the DP rules, which, backed by
an integrated system of alternative regulatory mechanisms, namely
appropriate nudging strategies, would allow data protection while
preserving the individual autonomy.
4. Limitations of the current safeguards: the privacy paradox
Given the relevance of informed consent for data protection, one
could expect that it suffices to strengthen these information obligations
and foster the provision of privacy policies to enable users to give a
meaningful, informed consent. 69
The proposed GDPR reinforced this concept; however, the reality
has shown that this still valuable mechanism is not working well in
practice, especially in the digital world.
One of the main criticisms to the informed consent requirement
relates to the weakness of the link between information about data
processing and consent and to the incapacity of consent to provide

66. Id. at77-78.
67. See id. at 77-80.
68. As examples of application of this rights-based approach see Case C-275/06,
Productores de Musica de Espana (Promusicae) v. Telefonica de Espana S.A.U., 2008 E.C.R.
1-00271 (Jan. 29, 2008); Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended S.A. v. Societe beige des auteurs,
compsiteurs et editeurs S.C.R.L. (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. 1-11959 (Nov. 24, 2011); Case C131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD), 2014 EURLex CELEX LEXIS 317 (May 13, 2014).
69. Although strictly connected, information obligations and informed consent are
separate concepts and requirements. Transparency principle (and consequent information
obligations) apply also in case of derogations from the consent requirements. This is
particularly relevant in all those cases in which it might be impossible to systematically collect
users' consent, but that still require the fulfilment of transparency principle about how data
are processed. See Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the
Profiling Era, in DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT YEARBOOK 41 (Jacques Bus et al. eds., 2012).
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effective control to users over their data. 70
While Internet users usually declare to be worried about online
privacy risks and to be aware of their privacy rights, in fact, the analysis
of their online behaviour and attitudes, in terms of personal data
disclosure, seems to suggest that they do not care about privacy. From
the Special Eurobarometer 359/2011 of the European Commission
("EB"), 71 emerges that the majority of Internet users report to read these
privacy notices when joining a social network or registering for a service
online. 72 However, most users' online behaviour shows that they do not
act according to their statements, as they do not read the privacy policies
entirely or they find it difficult to obtain information about a website's
data practices. 73 A large number of people are, nevertheless, concerned
that their personal data held by companies may be used for a purpose
other than that for which it was collected. 74 Similar surveys 75 seem to
confirm this attitude. 76
In sum, even when people declare to be worried about their privacy,
they do not read privacy policies and do not stop disclosing their data,
and even when people declare to read these notices they do not seem to
reduce privacy concerns. This phenomenon is also called as "the privacy
paradox" 77 and has led to questioning the adequacy of the current privacy
and data protection mechanisms. The idea that people do not care about
their privacy, however, appears too simplistic in light of the most recent
research and it has been discarded by most privacy scholars. 78
70. Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 48.
71. See Report of the Directorate-General ofJustice, Information Society & Media and
Joint Research Centre on Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the
European
Union,
at
137
(June
2011),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_ opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_ 359_ en.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015)
[hereinafter Attitudes on Data Protection].
72. Pan-European Survey of Practices, supra note 18, at 1.
73. Tsai et al., supra note 22, at 17-18.
74. Id. at 1.
75. See Lee Raine, Aaron Smith & Maeve Duggan, Coming and Going on Facebook,
PEW
RES.
CTR.
2
(Feb.
5,
2013),
available
at
http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP _ Coming_and_going_ on_face
book.pdf (last visited Dec/ 18, 2015). For a user survey in mobile context (e.g., about the
consent provision in the use of Apps by young students) see generally Yue Liu, User Control
of Personal Information Concerning Mobile-app: Notice and Consent?, 30 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REV. 521 (2014).
76. Tsai et al., supra note 22, at 254. See also Hoofuagle et al., supra note 32, at 3.
77. See Pan-European Survey of Practices, supra note 18, at 16, 47, reporting and
building upon the European Commission's discussion of the Special Euro barometer
359/2011. See Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Union,
supra note 71, at 112-15.
78. See, e.g., Hoofuagle et al., supra note 32, at 3-4; Danah Boyd & Alice Marwick,
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Studies have shown that the reasons for the limitations of informed
consent and privacy notices should be ascribed, first of all, to the lack of
sufficient information for the users to make a pondered decision about
data disclosure, that is, an accurate cost-benefit analysis. 79 This is also
called information asymmetry between users (they are unaware or they
do not have enough information on what happens with their data) and
data controllers (companies or governmental entities that collect and
process users' data). 80 This knowledge asymmetry suffered by users
about further use of data is particularly sharpened on the Internet, where
it is easier to collect data and where "Big Data is poised to reshape the
way we live, work and think." 81 The characteristics of Big Data as new
technological trend and the entities capable to handle the power of
knowledge deriving from it are unknown to most of people, who often do
not have (or see) alternatives to consent to their data collection. In the
mobile context, then, the lack of meaningful choice to consent to the use
of Apps is even more evident when someone talks about the subject's
consent as "blind consent." 82
Regulators tried to cope with this asymmetry, imposing stricter
information requirements to data controllers before (or contextually to)
the collection of data as transparency mechanisms (like privacy notices).

Social Privacy in Networked Publics: Teens' Attitudes, Practices, and Strategies 1-29 (Sept.
available
at
2011)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1925128 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015);
Norberto Andrade & Shara Monteleone, Digital Natives and the Metamorphosis of the
European Information Society. The Emerging Behavioral Trends Regarding Privacy and
Their Legal Implications, in EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION: COMING OF AGE 119, 120 (Serge
Gutwirth et al. eds., 2013).
79. Acquisti, supra note 45.
80. See Frederik J. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Consent to Behavioural Targeting in
European Law - What are the Policy Implications of Insights from Behavioural Economics?
3 (July 27, 2013) (Amsterdam Law School, Research Paper No. 2013-43), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300969 (last visited Dec. 18, 2015),
who stresses that users do not know how their data will be treated and even if they knew, they
ignore the consequences of future data use. As he notices, this information asymmetry (and
in particular the lack of knowledge about the economic 'value' of own data) would be also
the reason why consent within Data Protection regime cannot be considered only under the
economic perspective, as a trade-off between 'two parties', an exchange of free service v.
personal data. Another reason, however, may be seen in the legal significance of data
protection as a public interest in a democratic society, from which a different consideration
of consent would stem: its nature would be seen as authorization (like an administrative act)
rather than as a contractual agreement). See Le Metayer & Monteleone, supra note 60, at
137.
81. Kennet N. Cukier & Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger, The Rise of Big Data, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (May 2013), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/l39l04/kennethneil-cukier-and-viktor-mayer-schoenberger/the-rise-of-big-data (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
82. Liu, supra note 75.
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The assumption is that if users receive appropriate and clear information,
they will be able to take a pondered decision about consenting or not to
their data processing by, for instance, a website or Social Network: this
may include the installation of cookies on one's own device. 83
However, even if complete and detailed information is provided by
data controllers, 84 studies have proved that current privacy notices are not
effective: they fail to help data subjects in their decision-making and
consequent behaviour as regards to their data disclosure. Traditional
privacy policies are "hard to read, read infrequently, and do not support
rational decision-making." 85
Information asymmetries seem difficult to solve, as people are
discouraged to read privacy polices (and thus interpret them in their
favor): transactional costs (namely the time needed for users to read and
interpret them, in case complete information is provided) would make
this information asymmetry even more difficult to overcome. 86 In
addition, users have to face increasing uncertainty in online environments
due to new technological capabilities of tracking systems, with
information being gathered in different ways and by new actors: lacking
common standards, privacy policies change frequently (though not
always clearly) in order to include these upgrades, making the task of
keeping abreast with the recent version even more difficult for users. 87
Some scholars go even further, claiming that even well-informed
and rational individuals could not appropriately self-manage their privacy
due to several structural problems: a) there would be too many entities
collecting and using personal data to make the self-management system
(i.e., consent) feasible and b) many privacy harms would be the result of

83. See Council Directive 2002/58 2002 O.J. (L 201) (EC) as modified by Council
Directive 2009/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) (EC) (cookies Directive). For a recent overview on
functional and not functional cookies, see Joasia Luzak, Privacy Notice for Dummies?
Towards European Guidelines on How to Give "Clear and Comprehensive Information" on
the Cookies' Use in Order to Protect the Internet Users' Right to Online Privacy, 37 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 547, 547-49 (2014).
84. That is assuming companies' fairness in providing true information. Whether
companies are not faithful to their privacy policies is, rather, an accountability issue, a matter
that goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, it must be noted that further use of data
by third parties is often deliberately not covered by a privacy policy, so that companies are
exempted from responsibility of third party's processing of data.
85. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 19, at 541.
86. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22, at 372; McDonald & Cranor, supra note 19,
at 546; Borgesius, supra note 80, at 31.
87. Kirsten Martin, Transaction Costs, Privacy and Trust: The Laudable Goals and
Ultimate Failure ofNotice and Choice to Respect Privacy Online, 18 FIRST MONDAY (Dec.
2, 2013), available at http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/frn/article/view/4838/3802 (last
visited Dec. 18, 2015).
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an aggregation of pieces of data by different entities. 88 Therefore, the
current privacy self-management "which takes refuge in consent,"89
through the notice and choice mechanism, does not seem to provide
people with meaningful control over their data.
The 'notice and choice' mechanism is especially popular in the U.S.,
but similar considerations can be made in the EU as far as informed
consent is required to process personal data.
B. Addressing the drawbacks: alternative mechanisms to traditional
privacy policies

1. A legal-technical approach
The privacy paradox emerging from users' attitudes and behaviour
online, might be explained in terms oflack of suitable and flexible legaltechnical instruments for users to safeguard their privacy, while they seek
to enjoy the advantages of innovation and technology. 90
Attempts to address this lack are not missing, especially in
multidisciplinary research environments, where scholars, since at least
two decades, have pointed out the need to achieve a more integrated legaltechnical approach to privacy. 91 The main idea is that many privacy
concerns and legal implementation issues might be addressed through a
good technical design that embeds fundamental privacy principlesbetter known as the privacy by design approach ("PbD"). 92 Privacy
88. So love, supra note 31, at 1888-89.
89. Id. at 1880.
90. A point that emerges from these surveys is that users (and in particular the
youngsters, so called 'Digital Natives') when dispose of adequate mechanisms to avoid
privacy risks they make better decisions or they create their own strategies. See Pan-European
Survey of Practices, supra note 18; see also Boyd & Marwick, supra note 78.
91. See, e.g., Yves Poullet, Pour une Troisieme Generation de Reglementations de
Protection de Donnees, 3 JUSLETTER (2005); Mireille Hildebrandt, Legal and Technological
Normativity: More (and Less) than Twin Sisters, 12 TECHNE: RES. PHIL. TECH. 169 (2008);
ANDREW MURRAY, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW: THE LAW AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 2010).
On the concepts of "Transparency Enhancing Technologies," allowing citizens to possibly
anticipate how they will be profiled and the consequence of that see Gordon Hull et al.,
Contextual Gaps: Privacy Issues on Facebook, 13 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 289 (2011); Shara
Monteleone, Privacy and Data Protection at the Time of Facial Recognition: Towards a New
Right to Digital Identity?, 3 EUR. J. L. TECH. (2012). See Hildebrandt, supra note 69, at 5259.
92. See, e.g., Ann Cavukian, Privacy by Design and the Emerging Personal Data
Ecosystem,
PRIVACY
BY
DESIGN
(Oct.
2012),
available
at
http://privacybydesign.ca/content/uploads/2012/10/pbd-pde.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
This approach was formally embraced in 2010 by Privacy Commissioners at their 32nd
International Conference, in Jerusalem, where an ad hoc Resolution was adopted. See
Resolution on Privacy by Design, 320 INT'L CONF. DATA PROTECTION & PRIVACY
COMMISSIONERS
(Oct.
27-29,
2010),
available
at
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enhancing technologies ("PET"), based on specific technical settings that
embed privacy principles, proved to play a relevant role in support of
privacy and data protection.
The European Commission has been promoting for years legaltechnical measures at safeguard of these rights, as essential tools for
building confidence online. The Draft GDPR now formalizes the Data
Protection by design and by default principles, introducing specific norms
and constraints (Article 23). The close and complex relationship between
ICTs and public policy became particularly evident with the development
of the Internet and of the Information Society. As stressed in the recent
EC Communication on Internet Governance: 93 "Technical details of
Internet protocols and other information technology specifications can
have significant public policy implications. Their design can impact on
human rights such as users' data protection rights and security, [and] their
ability to access diverse knowledge and information .... "
The
Commission, although welcomed the efforts of the international technical
community to establish approaches to specification setting based on
public policy concerns, 94 acknowledged that key decisions are frequently
made by technical experts in the absence of efficient mutual interactions
between technical and public policy considerations. 95
"This is
particularly important when legal rights of individuals, especially their
human rights, are clearly impacted."96
Special attention should be paid in the design of specific Internet
http://privacyconference201 l .org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/201O_Jerusalem/201 O_J5 .pdf
(last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
93. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region, International
Policy and Governance Europe's Role in Shaping the Future ofInternet Governance, at 4, 89, COM (2014) 72 final (Dec. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Shaping the Future of Internet
Governance].
94. Internet Governance Principles, NETMUNDIAL (Apr. 23-24, 2014), available at
http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/intemet-governance-principles/176 (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015). Positive examples include recent technical guidance for privacy
considerations in new protocols. See the guidelines elaborated by the Internet Architecture
Board (IAB), Cooper et al., Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols, INTERNET
ARCHITECTURE BOARD (July 2013), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6973.pdf (last
visited Dec. 18, 2015), which are a development of many sets of privacy principles (like the
Fair Information Practices and the privacy by design frameworks that have been developed in
different forums over the years). Interestingly, in the recent JAB 's guidelines, user
participation and interaction is taken into account.
95. These considerations seem to be at the basis also of the European Commission
Decision of28 November 2011. See Commission Decision of28 November 201 l on Setting
up the European Multi-stake Platform on ICT Standardisation, 2011 O.J. (C 349) 4, in which
a plurality of different actors are called to contribute to the definition of the ICT
standardization.
96. Shaping the Future of Internet Governance, supra note 93, at 9.
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architecture, especially with the advent of new digital and smart
technologies, given that normativity of technology may be as relevant and
effective as the normativity of law (though different) and have an impact
on human behaviour and conduct. 97 Moreover, the adoption of ad hoc
legal-technical measures to improve the level of transparency online like
"Transparency Enhancing Technologies" ("TETs") is also urged. 98 Most
users are not even aware that their data are collected or that they are being
tracked and profiled while surfing the web 99 : enhanced transparency
might help individuals to understand how their personal data are used and
what the potential dangers are. Given that information flows are growing
dramatically, TE Ts might be critical. 100 The increase of transparency (on
how the data are used) and the availability of easy-to-use privacy-control
mechanisms are considered essential aspects in order to ensure a
sustainable flow of data that makes privacy to be a virtue for both
business and users:
[While transparency] might initially reduce sharing, it limits the risk
of brand damage and helps to attract more informed customers . ...
[P]rivacy controls should be available and easy to use. They will
significantly increase data-sharing by individuals, likely offsetting any
negative impact on sharing resulting from increased transparency. 101
Methods of providing information and offering the right to refuse
should be as user-friendly as possible. This seems to stem from the ePrivacy Directive 102 and also from the draft GDPR (Article 11). 103
Therefore, companies should go beyond the drafting oflong and complex
privacy policies as the most suitable way to inform users about processing
of their own data and it would be also in their own interests to resort to
alternatives to traditional notice and choice mechanisms in order to
increase trust in online practices. Consequently, rather than only using

97. See Hildebrandt, supra note 69; see also HUMAN LAW AND COMPUTER LAW:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Mireille Hildebrandt & Jeanne Gaakeer eds. , 2013).
98. Hildebrandt, supra note 69.
99. See generally Borgesius, supra note 79; Hildebrandt & Koops, supra note 59.
100. See Claude Castelluccia & Arvind Narayanan, Privacy Considerations of Online
Behavioural Tracking, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR N ETWORK & INFO. SECURITY (Oct. 19,
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-andat
available
2012),
trust/library/deliverables/privacy-considerations-of-online-behavioural- tracking (last visited
Dec. 18, 2015).
101. The Value of Our Digital Identity, Boston Consulting Group 17 (2012), available
at http://www.libertyglobal.com/PDF/public-policy/The-Value-of-Our-Digital-Identity. pdf
(last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
102. See Council Directive 2002/58 , 2002 O.J. (L 201) (modified by Council Directive
2009/136/EC).
103. Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2, at 47.
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written privacy policies that the majority of users do not read, companies
should engage into alternative ways and instruments-more visual,
explicit, simple and user-friendly-to inform Internet users and help them
make aware decisions.
Among the remedies identified in literature to cope with the
"laudable goals and ultimate failure of notice and choice to respect
privacy online," 104 we can find in particular suggestions aimed to: (1)
ameliorate the current notice and choice structure through opportune
legislation, industry best practices and privacy enhancing technologies;
(2) given the limited users' empowerment due to information asymmetry
and transaction costs, focus on privacy reputation and trust, built by
companies around respecting privacy expectations; 105 and (3) building on
a stream of privacy scholarship that looks at a tort-law model of privacy
protection, 106 develop privacy rules by identifying specific harms and
consequences of data disclosure. The underlying idea is a shift from the
notification scheme to managing privacy expectations within a specific
context: a consequence-based approach to privacy that would be more
pragmatic and beneficial also for companies than the current notice and
choice, as the privacy norms would be constructed thinking to the harms
and not to abstract risks of privacy violations.
Legal-technical proposals to solve the problem of the burdensome
requirement of consent also include software personal agents, as an
automatic way to achieve the protection of privacy. The underlying idea
is that a technological architecture based on "Privacy Agents," which
meets a series of legal requirements to ensure the validity of consent
delivered through such an agent, could be useful to avoid overwhelming
the data subject with repeated requests of consent, while protecting
his/her privacy by respecting pre-settled preferences. 107
Similar measures may be included amid all those technical solutions
that embed and implement specific legal rules, also known as technoIn Ambient Intelligence contexts such as smart
regulation. 108
104. Martin, supra note 87.
105. In particular, according to Martin, firms have multiple tools at their disposal to
meet privacy expectations, through three options: increase the obscurity of data exchange so
to decrease the probability that information will be leaked; decrease the possible harm that
could come from a leakage by using 'do not use' rules, limiting the use of data; increase the
benefits of information exchange (possible uses of data) for individuals and society). Id.
106. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harms, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011);
Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140 DAEDALUS,J. AMERICAN
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 32 (2011).
107. Le Metayer & Monteleone, supra note 60.
108. Bibi van der Berg, Colouring Inside the Lines: Using Technology to Regulate
Children's Behavior Online, in 24 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & LAW SERIES: MINDING
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environments/cities (so called due to the capability of the sophisticated
computer systems used to mine masses of personal and not personal data),
TETs would allow citizens to anticipate how they will be profiled and
which consequences this may entail. 109 However, the complexity and
quantity of information produced by transparency enhancing
technologies could overwhelm individuals, if this information were
provided in the form of text, requiring their conscious attention:
TETs will only succeed in empowering citizens if ... [they do] not
inundate a person with detailed technical information that requires her
scrutiny in a way that nullifies all the 'advantages' of ubiquitous and
seamless computing. . . . [They] will have to communicate the relevant
information in a way that allows one to have 'a feel' of the environment's
interpretation of one's behaviour, rather than merely adding more text or
graphs to the equation. 110
That is to say that even and primarily in the imminent digitalized
and automated world, complementary mechanisms should be promoted
in order to ensure that improved information about data processing is
provided to the users. Layering of notice may be a step in this direction:
data controllers may distribute the required information over different
and progressive layers, such as, the short notice, the condensed notice and
the complete notice. 111 In general, better ways of presenting information
to people, short messages together with educational programs may
mitigate inconvenience. 112
However, providing simplified, standardized privacy information,
although of some benefits, has proved to be also insufficient (e.g., cookies
alerts): users might end up simply ignoring them and accepting all the
requests of consent, by clicking on numerous message boxes. 113
Nevertheless, it seems that "there is no limit to the ways in which
MINORS WANDERING THE WEB: REGULATING ONLINE CHILD SAFETY SERIES 67-84 (Simone
van der Hof et al. eds., 24th ed. 2014); see also Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge or Notice?, 99 IOWA
L. REV. 773 (2014).
I 09. Hildebrandt, supra note 69, at 53.
110. Id. (stressing that this, however, does not mean that a more precise access to the
technical details must not be available, for instance to enable a person being subjected to
unfair decision making on the basis of automatic profiling, to contest the application of
profiles in a court of law).
111. Opinion of the Data Protection Working Party on "More Harmonised Information
(Nov.
25,
2004 ),
available
at
Provisions"
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp I 00_ en.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2015); Brendan Van Alsenoy, Privacy-friendly 'model' privacy policies, SECURITY
& PRIVACY IN ONLINE NETWORKS PROJECT [SPION] (June 2013), available at
https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-2363.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
112. Luzak, supra note 83, 553-54.
113. Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 8.
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transparency and autonomous decision-making can be stimulated. Future
research efforts should continue to seek out additional mechanisms to
enhance transparency, both on ex ante and post fact basis." 114 Therefore,
instead of rejecting tout court the notice and consent mechanisms as not
effectively implementing the transparency principle, we should try
understanding the underlying reasons, the actual users' attitudes and
behaviours and seek out alternative, innovative and integrated ways to
enhance them. 115
2. An integrated behavioural economic approach

PhD approach and TETs are supposed to increase user's control over
his personal data. However, advanced technical control mechanisms,
though necessary, might not be sufficient if relevant cognitive and
behavioural "biases" in online users are not taken into account: 116 several
hurdles in privacy decision-making, in fact, have been highlighted by
behavioural science. 117
Empirical and social science research demonstrates that "there are
severe cognitive problems that undermine privacy self-management.
These cognitive problems impair individuals' ability to make informed,
rational choices about the costs and benefits of consenting to the
collection, use, and disclosure of their personal data." 118 In other words,
it is not enough having complete information about costs and benefits of
disclosing personal data, as other factors intervene on the user's privacy
choice and behaviour. 119 This line of enquiry has significant policy
implications: as it has been noticed, "the modem microeconomic theory
of privacy suggests that, when consumers are not fully rational or in fact
myopic, the market equilibrium will tend not to afford privacy protection
to individuals, and therefore privacy regulation may be needed to
improve consumer and aggregate welfare." 120
This seems particularly important if we consider how people think
and act in the online environment: individuals' cognitive limitations
mentioned before as regards information explain the failure of the rational
choice model and of the informed consent (in the U.S., the "notice and
choice" model) as regulatory techniques.
114. Van Alsenoy, supra note 111, at 9.
115. See Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (an Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV . 1027, 1033 (2012).
116. Acquisti, supra note 45, at 6.
117. Id.
118. Solove, supra note 31, at 1880-81.
119. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22, at 9.
120. Acquisti, supra note 45, at 6.

Published by SURFACE, 2015

27

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2015], Art. 4

96

Syracuse J. lnt'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 43: I

Behavioural insights help us understand and interpret these
limitations and fallacies. Moreover, as recent research has shown,
Behavioural Science, leveraging precisely on these cognitive limitations,
can also effectively support policy-making in identifying appropriate
mechanisms, e.g., nudging strategies, to help people's decision-making
and, eventually, achieving privacy protection in practice.
Building upon the abovementioned interdisciplinary approach in the
privacy field (integration of law and technology) a step further is
proposed here: to learn the lessons from behavioural science 121 and to
think of applying behavioural insights to policy-making in the area of
privacy, in the wake of behavioural-informed regulation already
operational in fields such as reduction of energy consumption, health
care, consumer protection, etc. 122
Cognitive psychology and behavioural economics, which provided
meaningful insights on individuals' behaviour in many domains 123-as
discussed in the next part of this article-have recently also explained
users' (apparently contradictory) attitudes and practices as regards their
privacy protection. 124 Eventually, the privacy paradox receives clearer
explanation (and possibly solutions) if looked in light of behavioural
science.
What is suggested here is, in other words, to explore not only
advanced technical versions of transparency mechanisms, but to identify
and test alternative and complementary measures for users' better
decision-making as regards data protection; a new approach that, without
discarding the notice and choice system per se and taking into account
behavioural insights, may provide more suitable, flexible and effective
privacy-enhancing mechanisms, such as privacy nudges and "visceral
notices," so called because based on certain common psychological
reactions of individuals to design, instead of engaging the slower,

121. See, e.g., the research activities conducted by the Danish 'i-Nudge-you' team,
tNUDGEYOU, available at http://www.inudgeyou.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2015). On the
increasing interest for behavioral science in policy and government management in USA, see
also Courtney Subramanian, 'Nudge' Back in Fashion at White House, TIME (Aug. 9, 2013),
available at http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/09/nudge-back-in-fashion-at-white-house/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2015); Professor Kevin Werbach, Beyond Nudges: Gamification as
Motivational Architecture, Speech at the 2013 CPDP Conference in Brussels (Jan. 23, 2013).
122. Michael S. Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally Informed
Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 440, 444-45 (Eldar Shafir ed.,
2012).
123. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges.gov: Behavioral Economics and Regulation, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 719, 719 (Eyal Zamir &
Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
124. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22.
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reflective way of thinking: they show, rather than tell. 125
The next part explores this line of research, after briefly considering
challenges and opportunities of applying behavioural insights to policymaking in general. These strategies, alternative to traditional privacy
notices might also represent a better implementation or at least integration
mechanisms of the Data Protection by Design approach, as codified in
the draft GDPR (Article 23).
IIII. INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS ON
INFORMATION PROVISION
In this part, opportunities and challenges of behavioural sciences
applied to public policy in general will be discussed, in order to better
understand the relevance of behavioural insights in the privacy area.
A. Applying behavioural science to policy: an overview
Applied behavioural science, often referred to as Behavioural
Economics ("BE"), studies human behaviour for better policy-making.
Since the 1970s, BE revealed that people, in their daily life, do not
always act "rationally," as suggested by neoclassical assumptions in
economics, making choices that lead to the best outcome for them: on the
opposite, they often have preferences and take decisions that are not in
their interests (suboptimal choices): 126 in other words, people are not
perfectly rational in their cost-benefit considerations.
These deviations from rationality in individuals' decision-making
are commonly referred to as biases (e.g., mental shortcuts or 'rules of
thumb'), such as: myopia (people prefer short term gratifications to
disadvantages in long terms); social norms (people are influenced by
what the majority of people say or do, especially if there is a certain
affinity with these people--compatriots or neighbours, etc.); status quo
(people tend to stay with the default options); and.framing or prime effect
(people are influenced on how more than what information is given to
them).
Such findings about human behaviour-very briefly recalled herestarted to be taken into consideration by policymakers in the last decades
and progressively incorporated in policy interventions focused on
structuring the "choice architecture" for people's better decisions; the
choice architecture is understood as the background against which
decisions are made and that has major consequences for both decisions

125. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25.
126. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN , THINKING,
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and outcomes. 127 Also, BE highlighted that this does not mean that
people's behaviour is always irrational, random and unpredictable: on the
contrary, it can be predicted, modeled and thus guided. 128
BE has been regarded in recent years as a promising and exciting
new development in public policymaking theory and practice. 129
Consequently, the efforts to bring more accurate understanding of human
behaviour and choice to bear on law 130 have made that BE is now
considered as the new paradigm for the study of choice behaviour and,
on its basis, for the adoption of "behavioural informed regulation" 131 in
the most different policy areas. The behaviourally-informed approach to
regulatory problems, in fact, is gaining momentum, and its instruments,
so called nudges, in the form of notices, warnings and default rules, 132 are
becoming authentic policy tools.
The informal and cheap nature of these systems makes them more
appealing as compared to traditional coercive regulatory mechanisms,
like prohibitions, bans, etc. This regulatory approach is also called
libertarian paternalism, because leveraging insights on individuals'
attitudes and behaviours, claims to preserve their freedom of choice: the
combination of paternalism and individual freedom would not be an
oxymoron. This system is also named soft paternalism as opposed to
hard paternalism. 133
A number of public and private institutions have already embraced
this approach as its instruments proved to be more effective than common
legal instruments in addressing old and new challenges, like the energy
consumptions reduction, health care, saving accounts, etc. In the U.S.,
the Obama Administration intensively counted on behavioural findings

127. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 1.
128. See Amitai Etzioni, Behavioral Economics: Toward a New Paradigm, 55 AM .
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1099, 1102-03 (2011); Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 122, at 440.
129. See generally Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims
Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014), who, however, urge for greater awareness
of the tension between the two "seductive" dimensions of Behavioural Law and Economics
(its appeal as social science and politics) and consequent limits. Accordingly, policy-makers
can in future resort to Behavioural economics for improving the design of law and policy
(adopting choice-preserving regulatory tools) in more appropriate and context-dependent
ways, i.e. pondering advantages and disadvantages of the different regulatory mechanisms
(traditional or new) available.
130. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
131. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).; Mullainathan & Shafir, supra
note 122, at 428.
132. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131.
133. See Oren Bar-Grill, Consumer Transactions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465,478 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
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for a number of initiatives and in UK an ad hoc 'Behavioural Insights
team' within the Cabinet office has been created. 134 At the intersection
of"applied behavioural science, public institutions, NGO's and private
stakeholders" are initiatives such as iNudgeYou - initiated as a Danish
Nudging Network and become an international landmark. 135
European policy-making is also increasingly relying on behavioural
insights, both at its design and its implementation phases. Surveys to
collect consumers' perceptions and preferences, lab experiments and
more accurate behavioural observation methods (i.e., randomized
controlled trials) are promoted by the EU in different areas of
intervention, with the aim to foster better individuals' decisionmaking.136 Behavioural insights are, for instance, at the basis of the
recent regulation aimed to limit the default options in consumer contracts
or to improve consumer protection in booking travel packages. 137 As a
new but quite spread trend, varying communitarian goals are being
pursued through nudging strategies such as "green behaviors," 138 as well
as improvement in consumer decisions regarding, for instance, retail
investments 139 or, more recently, digital purchases. 140
B. Applying behavioural science to policy: challenges and

134.
See Who We Are, BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TEAM, available at
http://www.behaviouralinsights.eo.uk/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
135. See iNudgeyou - The Danish Nudge Unit, tNUDGEYOU, available at
http://inudgeyou.com/about-us/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
136. See generally Rene van Bavel et al., Applying Behavioural Sciences to EU PolicyMaking, JRC SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY REPORTS EUR 26033 EN 14-19 (2013), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/information_sources/docs/30092013 jrc_ sci enti fie
_policy_report_en.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
137. See Council Directive 2011/83, art. 22, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 64, 81 (EU); see also

Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council On
Package Travel and Assisted Travel Arrangements, at 4, COM (2013) 512 final (Sept. 7,
2013).
138. See, e.g., Science for Environmental Policy Future Brief Green Behaviour, EUR.
COMMISSION
(Oct.
2012),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/integration/research/newsalert/future_ briefs.htm
(last
visited Dec. 20, 2015).
139. See, e.g., Consumer Decision-Making in Retail Investment Services: A Behavioural
Economics
Perspective
(Nov.
2010),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/strategy/docs/final_report_en.pdf(last visited Dec. 20,
2015).
140. See, e.g., Gabriele Esposito, Consumer Information in the Digital Online Market A Behavioral Approach, CIDOM REP., JRC SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL REP. 5, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/consumer-marketing/files/report_ cidom_ final.pdf (last visited
Dec. 20, 2015).
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opportunities
As said before, policy-making is increasingly relying on behavioural
studies and nudging strategies for citizens' better decision-making in
different areas of intervention.
Applying
This happens, however, not without concerns. 141
behavioural science to policy-making requires a thorough consideration
of a number of different issues. 142 At least two main categories of
problems can be identified as far as the application of the behavioural
approach to policy-making is concerned. On the one hand, the legal
grounds of its mechanisms that rely on influence and persuasion in order
to obtain a behaviour change and creates a new power, potentially subject
to abuse. On the other, their (lack of) generalized applicability: a nudge
might not have the expected outcome if used in different areas or with
different audiences.
The same legitimacy of the nudging system itself within a
democratic society might be put in doubt or at least questioned. 143 Most
existing criticisms seem to point to the fact that, while a good nudge
influences individual choices without changing freedom of choice,
sometimes the line between persuasion and manipulation is not easy to
see and goes together with the fear of being maneuvered.
Nudges can be stronger or weaker than the law and coercive as well,
but the problem is the risk that they might be adopted without the legal
safeguards proper of the legislative processes. Moreover the effect of
nudges may be very different, depending on context or on the interests of
the parties involved. 144
A substantial regulation of these alternative measures is, therefore,
urged, capable to formalize these behavioural-informed mechanisms and
141. See, e.g., Karen Yeung, Nudge as Fudge, 75 MODERN L. REV. 122, 123-24 (2012);
see also Alberto Alemanno & Alessandro Spina, Nudging Legally. On the Checks and
Balances of Behavioural Regulation, 12 INT'L J. CONST. L. 429 (2014).
142. Neven Mimica, Applying Behavioural Insights to Policy-Making: Results,
(Sept.
30,
2013),
available
at
Promises
and
Limitations
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/information_sources/consumer_affairs_events_en.
htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2015) (discussing the opportunities and limitations of applying
behavioral science to policy making in all areas of interest at a European Commission
conference in Brussels).
143. See Pelle G. Hansen & Andreas M. Jespersen, Nudge and the Manipulation of

Choice: A Framework for the Responsible Use of the Nudge Approach to Behaviour Change
in Public Policy, 4 EuR. J. RISK REG. 3, 5 (2013); Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141, at 445.
See generally Anne van Aaken, Judge the Nudge: In Search of the Legal Limits of
Paternalistic Nudging in the EU, in NUDGE AND THE LAW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 83
(Alberto Alemanno & Anne-Lise Sibony eds., 2015).
144. See generally Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1155 (2013).
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to guarantee an oversight system of the new kind of power they bring
Notwithstanding their informal nature, and given their
with. 145
persuasive quality, the adoption of these mechanisms cannot circumvent
basic principles of the State of Law, such as legality and impartiality. An
appropriate oversight system on behavioural-informed tools can
guarantee a smooth integration of behavioural science into public policy.
As some scholars propose:
[A] general requirement imposed to public administrations to
systematically consider formalized behavioral mechanisms at the prelegislative stage could serve to accommodate in a more principled and
consistent way these insights into policy making while at the same time
protecting them from possible abuses. 146
Their enclosure within the framework of essential legal principles
like proportionality seems necessary. These behavioural-based measures
should be pondered according to minimum criteria: their capacity of
pursuing a legitimate goal (i.e., individual, societal welfare); their
suitability; necessity (other available measures are not effective);
proportionality stricto sensu (i.e., the mildest measure have been chosen);
and foreseeability (at least as regards their purposes and consequences).
Invisible, non-transparent nudges should be considered not admissible. 147
A concrete guideline for policy-makers in order to avoid the
adoption of tools of illegitimate manipulation of people's choice, may be
the distinction between transparent and non-transparent nudges, which
might help to distinguish the manipulative use of nudges from other kinds
of uses and therefore to adopt a more responsible use of nudging approach
to behavioural change. 148 In particular, the choice of policy-makers
should fall on nudges aimed at promoting decision-making in ways that
are transparent to the people influenced, by "making features, actions,
preferences, and/or consequences salient, or by providing
feedback ...." 149 This kind of interpreting and guiding frameworks for
the use of 'nudges for good' should be endorsed so that nudges, if chosen
and adopted as policy tools, can work at the service of libertarian
paternalism. 150
Another aspect that should be borne in mind, is that alternative, nontraditional methods of changing citizens' behaviour, whether they are

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See generally id. at 1229.
Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141, at 455.
van Aaken, supra note 143, at 29-33.
Hansen & Jespersen, supra note 143, at 23.
Id. at 24.
See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 5-6.
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classified as code (like in the techno-regulation), nudges, or notice
(information disclosure), may both facilitate (help) or hinder (friction)
decision-making and a certain conduct. 151
Some non-traditional public interventions, if focused on obstacles or
barriers, may be more coercive than the law; physical barriers or digital
ones (code) like Digital Right Management Systems ("ORM") to enhance
copyrights, but also psychological ones, like some new virtual speed
limits made of painted images on the road (nudges) introduce an obstacle
to a conduct, making it harder or impossible for the individual to act
differently. In this case, resisting to a nudge is not without costs, like
discomfort, time associated to overcoming the architecture of the choice;
the individual autonomy in these cases might be unreasonably
jeopardized. In other words, the problem with these alternative measures
based on friction, would consist in the fact that they may introduce costs
and burdens to citizens while, meantime, they may be adopted without
the legal safeguards and guarantees proper of the legislative processes,
i.e., to be discussed, voted on by elected representatives and in cases,
challenged.
However, as Calo stresses, alternative mechanisms for behavioural
changes do not necessary and always need to build upon friction, like
they do some technical barriers to replace the deterrence function of law
(e.g., the doors accessing to a metro station, or the DRMs for copyright
protection, or the digital filters installed on a computer for the safety of
children). 152 Alternative systems should work by helping, nudging,
citizens to arrive to their own goals; instead of studying human behaviour
and cognitive biases in order to contrast them, it is better to help them.
An example may be represented by placing fruits or other healthy food at
eye-level in the cafeteria of a working place.
If policy intervention aims at modifying the choice architecture,
altering physical or digital environment, this should be not to impede,
prevent certain conducts but to facilitate better decision-making: "the
technology should keep its capacity to enhance and not diminish certain
essential democratic processes." 153 Accordingly, regulators should
explore the possibilities for helping citizens (in using code, nudge or
notice mechanisms-or a combination of them) in achieving by
themselves their own goals, before introducing forms of alternative but
coercive mechanisms (which may lack the safeguards and the process of
the law).
151. Calo, supra note 108, at 777.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 798.
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Therefore, when deciding about changes in architecture, regulators'
preference should be, where possible, for facilitation not for imposing
barriers, according to the theory that "we should abandon the safeguards
that [support the] law only when it can be said that we are helping citizens
do what they would do if they had the right information and tools." 154
As Calo stresses, combining certain elements of different strategies
provides more possibilities for facilitation. 155 A traditional notice does
not work, but elements of code and nudge may improve notices so to
become more effective, especially when notices are provided at the point
of decision-making and this is particularly relevant in the field of privacy
and data protection, as discussed below.
An example of successful notice mechanism relying on "nudging"
is offered by initiatives seeking to curb obesity, which instead of focusing
on traditional notice mechanisms like caloric information labels to
ameliorate people's eating/drinking habits, show the physical activity
equivalent needed to bum a certain amount of calories, e.g., running,
biking, etc., 156 or seek to directly encourage people to do more
exercise. 157
This facilitation role is not an easy task either; it is difficult to
understand when and how to facilitate decision-making (and to renounce
it because it does not work). Decision-making can depend entirely on the
framing or on the context, but in doubt of what influences our
preferences, we should adopt, as a guiding principle, facilitation rather
thanfriction. 158 At the end of the day, it is not important how we label a
public intervention in the choice-architecture as code, notice or nudge,
but regulators should look at the interventions that help. This can
mitigate also the concerns mentioned before about the legitimacy of
nudging strategies.
C. Applying behavioural science to policy: from information overload
to smart disclosure in Consumer Protection and in Data Protection
As demonstrated in other sectors (marketing or organization
science), the excess of information may have a negative effect on users'
choice quality. 159
154. Id. at 800.
155. Id.
156. Sara N. Bleich et al., Reduction in Purchases of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages
Among Low-Income Black Adolescents After Exposure to Caloric Information, 102 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 329 (2012).
157. Amitai Etzioni, On Curbing Obesity, 51 Soc'y 115 (2014).
158. See Calo, supra note 108.
159. See generally Byung-Kwan Lee & Wei-Na Lee, The Effect of Information
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Insights from behavioural studies have shown, in fact, that even
when presented with full information, consumers may not always be able
to understand or use information in their interest, i.e., to make the best
choice. This can be due to not necessarily the lack of information, but to
the fact that most of the information is not good; moreover, too much
information (although correct and accurate) may be useless and even
harmful. There is a moment in the information acquisition (like for the
information that we receive when we decide to buy a product or service)
in which the cost that a consumer has to spend to process the information
is higher than the benefit of ignoring it: this is also called "information
overload." 160
Studies on information overload and its effects on consumer
decision-making suggest that what matters is not (necessarily) to provide
the consumer with more information but to provide her with the good
one. 161
This is particularly relevant in the digital environment, on the
Internet, where users are constantly exposed to tons of information
difficult or impossible to absorb, to interpret and to use. The problem
with the traditional information notices (including privacy notices) is that
they constitute in many cases an example of "information overload."
Burdening the individual with information (whether it is on products and
services or on how personal data is processed or protected), is not the
solution.
As said before, one of the main lessons that policy-makers receive
from behavioural scientists is to work on the choice architecture, the
social background against which consumer decisions are made. 162 In this
way policy-makers are called to become a sort of choice architects, able
to make the appropriate, small changes in the underlying environment
that may have a large impact on people's behaviour. "Such changes may
involve disclosure, warnings, default rules, increased salience, and use of
social norms." 163

Overload on Consumer Choice Quality in an On-Line Environment, 21 PSYCHOL. &
159 (2004).
160. Id. at 177-78.
161. See the example of the regulatory measure adopted in US to counter the level of
obesity and imposing requirements to indicate the calories information on restaurant menus,
which did not get the expected results as people ignored them. Brian Eibel et al., Calorie
Labeling, Fast Food Purchasing and Restaurant Visits, 21 OBESITY 2172 (2013).
162. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131.
163. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Economics, Consumption, and Environmental
Protection 1 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Regulatory Policy Program, Working Paper No. RPP2013-19, 2013).

MARKETING
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The most important modification that should be made is salience: 164
salience of certain product's features or of a situation (like prices, sizes,
incentives), and, above all, of the information to be provided to people
about these features. Salience can work, in fact, as a nudge. 165 Therefore,
the information that people receive should be salient, upon salient
features and provided in a moment and a situation salient for these
people, enabling a process of "smart disclosure," i.e., of a more effective
information provision by those who are responsible for - that the public
policy is called to encourage.
Behavioural studies have invalidated a typical assumption
underlying many of the current public policies in consumer protection,
i.e., that individuals would make a cognitive effort to weigh costs and
benefits before taking a decision like buying or not buying a product. In
this way, they not only have shown that biases are also typical of policymakers (as made of human beings), but building upon Kahneman' s
insights about human cognitive processes, 166 have also highlighted that
people predominantly use the fast thinking system, that is, more intuitive,
more instinctive and rapid way of making decisions. 167
This suggests that traditional information policies are disregarding
important components of human cognitive process that reflect into
consumers' behaviour and that this might be the reason of their failure to
realize societal and individual best interests. This raised the question
whether a different, innovative policy intervention might be necessary to
help consumers adopt decisions in their best interests. 168
An important finding of BE (which has also shown to be useful in
order to attain a better public policy by conducting ad hoc experiments)
is that the more our activities are routinized, repeated on a daily basis, the
more we employ the fast thinking system. This is particularly interesting
for the decisions we take every day with regards to digital activities
(electronic communications, e-transactions, access to a service or
product); our activities on the Internet (and on the mobile digital
applications) are often made of repetitive and systematic gestures:
clicking a button while visiting websites, downloading applications or

164. Id. at 6, 9, 15-16.
165. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 721.
166. Kahneman, in particular, makes the distinction between thinkingfast and thinking
slow, and, as a consequence, between automatic behaviours and reflective choices. See
KAHNEMAN, supra note 126.
167. Id.
168. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Enhancing Competition in
Telecommunications: Protecting and Empowering Consumers, at 39, OECD Doc.
DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2007)1/FINAL (May 24, 2008).
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documents, sharing thoughts or pictures, etc. This is particularly true
with regard to terms and conditions of an online contract, that, in most of
the cases, we accept without reading them, as well as with regard to
privacy policies.
In light of recent specialized studies on users' privacy attitudes and
preferences, in fact, what was just observed for consumer information
seems to be valid for information privacy and related users' behaviour. 169
Consumer Protection (strictu sensu) and Data Protection are two
interconnected (though distinct) areas. 17 First, because the two fields
correspond to two very close EU law domains; the status of data subject
and of online consumer are often aligned or overlapping, with the data
subject being very often also, in the meantime, a consumer; secondly,
because the information provision obligation (bearing on data controller
or on service provider, who may coincide) and its effects on the
corresponding individual's decision-making has equivalent relevance (in
one case, regarding his consumer behaviour in buying a product/service,
in the other one his citizens' behaviour in disclosing (or not) personal
data).
Given the extraordinary growth of Internet services and online
transactions, Data Protection is becoming increasingly important for
consumer. 171 The attention for it, therefore, is increasing, as it may
represent one of the instruments to realize the consumer protection. 172 In
other words, data protection is also (and in addition to its independent
status of a fundamental right) a way to attain consumer protection,
especially online; thus, similarities in the assessment of legal and nonlegal tools employed to strengthen individuals protection in the two
fields, namely information notices and nudges, may be drawn.
Recently, policy-makers started to work on minimizing detriment to
the consumer's interest resulting not only from a lack of information or
misleading information regarding services and products, but also from

°

169. See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22.
170. See IRIS B ENOHR, EU CONSUM ER LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 166 (2013).
171. Id.at59 .
I 72. The consumer protection has a principle status in the Charter of Fundamental Right
of the EU (Article 38), in the sense that it is intended as a legal principle rather than to have
the status of a subjective right. However, as other legal principles, this provision in the
Charter could evolve in the future and become a right (maybe with the development of the
case law). In particular it may become more concrete if it applied in combination with other
rights of the Charter. Id. (demonstrating that it is already happening). Article 38 could be
applied in combination with other rights of the Charter or constitutional provisions, for
instance with Article 8 on the right to data protection "in fact in some national cases a
cumulative application of basic provisions has resulted in successful claims for individuals."
Id. at 64.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol43/iss1/4

38

Monteleone: Addressing the 'Failure' of Informed Consent

2015]

Addressing the 'Failure' of Informed Consent

107

the "bounded rationality" of consumer decision-making. 173 If the
individual, recipient of the disclosure, is overwhelmed by information
without the possibility to discern what information is important, then
disclosure will have little positive effect. Behavioural studies have
demonstrated that alternative ways that try to induce people to behave in
their best interests may work better than traditional notice and choice or
"command and control" measures. 174 Regulators can learn how to
enhance information disclosure's effectiveness: "Disclosure has many
limitations, but there is also great opportunity for enhancing its beneficial
effects." 175
Consumer protection passes also by competition enhancing
policies 176 that focus their attention on demand side analysis (i.e., based
on insights from consumers' behaviour analysis). Policymakers and
regulators started to consider the needs and motivations underlying
consumer behaviour in communication markets, while in the meantime,
raising awareness about possible risks for consumers as well as
opportunities of protection. A main instrument to improve consumer
protection (and satisfaction) online has been identified in the quality of
information provision.
New requirements have been introduced
compelling, for instance, all major service operators to provide complete,
comparable and accurate information to consumers to reduce the
"information asymmetry" between operator and consumer and to enable
the latter to take the most suitable choices among products and services
offered online and therefore, among providers. 177
Likewise, we assisted to a proliferation of information obligations
and accountability rules in the Data Protection law, also in view of
ensuring a fair development of the digital single market, increasingly an
173. Id. at 81-82.
174. See Applying Behavioural Insights to Reduce Fraud, U.K. CABfNET OFF.
BEHAVIOURAL
INSIGHTS
TEAM
(2012),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/60539/BIT_FraudErrorDebt_accessible.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
175. Sunita Sah, Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein, Confessing One's Sins But
Still Committing Them: Transparency and the Failure ofDisclosure, in BEHAVIOURAL PUBLIC
POLICY 148, 158 (Adam Oliver ed., 2013).
176. OECD, supra note 168, at 5.
177. The idea is that further developments in competition policy should serve the
consumer interest. See id. at 6. The purpose of pro-competition policy is to enhance consumer
welfare; in other words, consumer protection and empowerment should be based on procompetition policy and mechanisms that have the consumer interest as priority. Id. at 4
("[W]here consumers have little information or poor quality information ... they may end up
misled and confused by the choices on offer, may pay too much or buy the wrong service.
This may, in tum, inhibit and dampen the competitive process .... [Consumers] need to be
able to move quickly and with the minimum constraint between service providers.").
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information-rich market. Providing innovative and more effective
information mechanisms for privacy may also prove to be an innovative
and effective competition-enhancing tool, which may benefit individuals
as well as businesses and the market in general.
Insights from BE, in fact, recently proved to be helpful also to
explain the privacy paradox (i.e., even in the presence of privacy notices
and warnings, 178 users tend to disclose a large amount of data) and to find
more effective privacy-enhancing mechanisms.
A multitude of systematic deviations from rational decision-making
that seems to have an impact on users' privacy decisions-making, besides
"incomplete information" and a "bounded cognitive ability" to process
the available information ( information asymmetry and transactional
costs), has been identified. 179 These deviations can be explained through
the same cognitive biases that BE has revealed in other areas: individuals
cannot see the risks deriving in the future from their data disclosure (or
from the use of a service that implies automatic data collection) and go
for immediate gratification of, for instance, free service (myopia); users
tend to stick with default options, this highlights the relevance of default
privacy settings for the privacy online; few users change them in practice
(status quo); users' privacy behaviour seems to be more influenced by an
image or an alert than by a long, though comprehensive, text (framing
effect).
Several behavioural biases, therefore, come into play and are critical
for the effectiveness of privacy policies. Like the legal information
notices on products and services relevant in consumer transactions,
privacy policies "are important transparency mechanisms, but are not
likely to be decisive in determining user behavior.... [They] are [not]
salient to consumers .... " 180 Although these reflections on privacy
policies are related to consumer's behaviour in the context of online
transactions, they are seemingly applicable to users' privacy behaviour in

178. A clarification is needed. The concepts of information notices and warning
messages may be (legally and technically) distinct and may have different purposes that
should be taken into account when testing and assessing users ' willingness to disclose data:
basically, the first have the purpose to inform about what/how data are collected and
protected, about users' rights, about the identity of the data controller, etc., while the warning
messages work as caveats, admonitions about possible risks of data disclosure: privacy
policies may contain both type of information, but, generally, current polices are made
predominantly of the first type.
179. Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 22, at 364.
180. See Irion & Luchetta, supra note 30, at 36-37, where it is argued that only if privacy
choices are embedded in a given transaction and effectuated by rules surrounding the sign-up
are consumers likely to align with their privacy preferences: "Hence, opt-in and opt-out rules
as well as default settings have strong impacts on the level of data disclosure."
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general, when facing information provisions.
There is a need for making the access to privacy policies easier,
simpler, agile and therefore more effective, so that users may be able to
make more informed decisions regarding the (direct or indirect)
disclosure of their personal information online. 181
IV. TOWARDS REGULATED PRIVACY NUDGES?
Knowing how users really behave with regard to their personal data
(often in contrast with their statements) may play a relevant role in
addressing the gap between existing legal privacy safeguards and
implementing tools. Therefore, like for other areas of policy intervention,
a better understanding of data subjects' behaviour should be of interest
for policymakers as it can assist them to design better privacy policies
and, ultimately, to fill in this gap; behavioural insights can be applied so
to identify and adopt innovative privacy-protecting measures.
The solution to the privacy paradox, in fact, does not seem to be the
introduction of new principles and rules. Behavioural economics propose
the introduction of (tested) tools like "privacy nudges" to be applied in
contexts of behavioural advertising, location sharing and social
networks. 182 More suitable, effective privacy tools, capable to keep pace
with modem times, but especially to support users in their decisionmaking, i.e., "supporting-choice mechanisms," 183 should be introduced.
As said in the previous part, behavioural science applied to policymaking is not new to European institutions, as a number of experimental
studies in support of policy initiatives are being run by the European
Commission. Still, the consideration of behavioural insights in the
specific area of privacy is very limited in Europe, both at academic and
institutional levels and restricted to the analysis of behavioural patterns
in online users as regards their data disclosure habits.
Few experimental studies have been commenced in the EU, as
discussed below. However, there hasn't been so far, to my knowledge,
any completed experimental study in Europe testing the nudging effects
on users' behaviour, as a way to foster a privacy-protective behaviour,
nor the application of behavioural science to policy-making in the area of
privacy. Also in Europe, we should support the idea that, instead of
discarding the option of notice and choice (i.e., informed consent),
181. See generally Acquisiti & Grossklags, supra note 22.
182. Alessandro Acquisti, From the Economics to the Behavioral Economics ofPrivacy:
A Note, in ETHICS AND POLICY OF BIOMETRICS 23, 23-26 (Ajay Kumar & David Zhang eds.,
2010).
183. van Aaken, supra note 143, §III, § C.
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because it is not effective, it is worthy to try improving it with nudging
mechanisms, which help citizens to make their decisions on data
protection/disclosure, i.e., using appropriate behaviour insights to create
more effective privacy notices.
Privacy nudges, as complementary regulatory tools would seek at
encouraging, at nudging a privacy-protective behaviour, while preserving
the freedom of choice of the users, achieving the soft or libertarian
paternalism: as said before, it is not an oxymoron, if well interpreted and
implemented. 184 There seems to be enough space for its application also
in the privacy area.
Nudging privacy seems to be possible and desirable, once the
conditions for its application (similar to those applicable to other areas)
are satisfied, i.e.: (1) the privacy nudges are subject to an oversight
mechanism and proportionality test; (2) given that these mechanisms may
have a double side quality (i.e., preserving and compromising freedom at
the same time), avoid that users are heavily charged with the
responsibility of DP; (3) the privacy nudges have been proven to worki.e., to have a positive impact on a target, being it privacy-preserving
behaviour or increased awareness; and (4) ensure control mechanisms of
companies compliance with DP obligations, the latter point may entail
strengthening the powers of national DP authorities. Further research
may investigate the best and efficient way to identify and implement
these control mechanisms.
Soft paternalism and nudging strategies, under these conditions, can
be the way forward for privacy protection online.
A. Visceral notices
Against this background, and without dismissing a rights-based
approach, perhaps it is time also in Europe to build upon that strand of
international lawyers and behavioural scientists who have proposed a
new dimension of privacy notices as innovative strategies that impact
privacy-related attitudes, like the so-called "visceral notices." 185 The
main underlying idea is that information notices should have less text and
more interaction.
Unlike traditional notice that relies upon text or symbols to convey
information, "emerging strategies of 'visceral' notice leverage a
consumer's very experience of a product or service to warn or inform." 186
Moreover, they prove to be useful tools to better inform users about data
184. Sunstein, supra note 163, at 313-27.
185. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 3.
186. Calo, supra note 115, at l 027.
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collection practices (i.e., hidden collection).
Some visceral notices are particularly interesting because based on
"certain common psychological reactions to design to change a
consumer's mental model of a product or service; and 'showing'
consumers instead of 'telling' them, i.e., demonstrating the result of
company practices for the specific consumer, rather than describing the
practices themselves." 187
Previous experiments 188 not only demonstrated the weakness of
traditional explicit notices, but also that visceral notices are more
successful at eliciting privacy-protective behaviour, by pulling users'
automatic responses. 189 Visceral notices, such as an interactive character
that speaks or moves her eyes while user types or moves the mouse, or
the display of the user's location or browsing history, seem to affect
privacy-related attitudes and behaviours.
Not every nudge has the same effect and is interchangeable, though.
A relevant finding of these studies is that a visceral notice represented by
an informal interface ("informal condition") to be employed, for instance,
in children's websites, prove to reduce privacy concerns, but also to
increase data disclosure by users, making the informal design problematic
for data protection and privacy policy.
User data disclosure is a complex behaviour. 190 People disclose their
information also indirectly, that is, when they are not asked (directly) to
reveal their data, when they are not alerted to the sensitivity of the
information itself and therefore not urged to "regulate" the disclosure of
information. In the indirect disclosure (very frequent in Web browsing),
the traditional notice mechanism clearly fails its goal:
The drive to regulate does not minimize passive [i.e., indirect]
disclosure. Passive disclosure is more successfully minimized with
visceral notice strategies, such as interactive agents, because they
directly affect the desire to disclose and do not rely on the more
thoughtful process of determining if privacy is threatened. 191
The use of a visceral notice such as an interactive agent (e.g., an
anthropomorphic silhouette), minimizes user's data disclosure, without
relying on service provider's privacy policy. In other words, it appears
that this kind of visceral notice has better impact on the user's "fast
thinking."
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 1033-34.
Id. at 1054.
See Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 27.
Id.
Id. at 28.
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Most important, this sort of nudge seems to succeed in eliciting
privacy-protective behaviour, reducing data disclosure without creating
privacy concerns (what traditional transparency tools usually do).
1. The BREVE experimental project: Behavioural Responses to Privacy
Visceral Notices
Building upon previous research on "visceral notices" 192 and on
"privacy nudges," 193 the project Behavioural Responses to Privacy
Visceral Notices ("BREVE") has been undertaken by one of the research
institutes of the European Commission between 2013 and 2014. 194
This study examines, via an online experiment and a survey, how
users' online behaviour changes when they are exposed to visceral
notices 195 and real-time alerts about the data collection practices
associated with their online activities. 196 The underlying idea is to assert
to what extent the use of well-designed, intuitive notices effectively
change users' behaviour as regard personal data disclosure. 197 The goal

192. Id.
193. Yang Wang et al., Privacy Nudges for Social Media: An Exploratory Facebook
Study, PROC. OFTH E22 INT'LCONF. WWW COMPANION (2013). See generally Leslie K. John
et al., The Best of Strangers: Context Dependent Willingness to Divulge Personal Information
(July 6, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l430482 (last visited Dec. 20, 2015);
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Privacy and Technology: Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126
HARV. L. REV. 2010 (2013); Alessandro Acquisti, Nudging Privacy: The Behavioral
Economics of Personal Information, 7 IEEE SECURITY & PRIY ACY 82, 82, 84 (2009);
Alessandro Acquisti et al. , The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose,
49 J. MARKETfNG RES. 160 (2012).
Behavioral
Economics ,
JOINT
RES.
CENTRE,
available
at
194.
http://is.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pages/BE/BEindex.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2015) (for more
information about the BREVE project).
195. Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 27.
196. In particular, a series of online experiments on EU users, in which 8 conditions,
represented by different privacy notices, is run: beside the traditional (standard and simplified
text notices), five types of more innovative notices are displayed to different groups of on line
participants, who were asked to assess a new (mock-up) search engine, in particular: an
anthropomorphic agent (static and interactive); the IP and the search history (displayed on a
side of the screen); an informal interface (colourful and youngish appearance). Wang, supra
note 193.
197. The online experiment involves, in the first phase, the construction of a mock-up
search engine that the participants are invited to evaluate through a survey; in the second part,
participants are asked to choose among some trivial questions and search for their answers
through the search engine: in this phase, the choice of the questions is what matters most.
Since these questions vary in terms of the nature and amount of personal information they
lead participants to reveal, the choice of questions by participants represents a measure of
their level of indirect disclosure of personal information. In fact, one of the three questions
in each set (randomly) is a personal data-disclosure question (such as: "What is the street
address of a post office in the town where you live?"). The differences among treatments is
given by the presentation of different privacy notices (including visceral notices), that are
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is to check if any of the treatments affects participants' privacy concerns,
if it leads to a significant different personal data disclosure (both direct
or indirect data disclosure) and what policy considerations can be
drawn. 198
B. Integrating behavioural insights into privacy policy making?
Once the issues on legitimacy of innovative privacy notices (namely
visceral notices or privacy nudges) are addressed and after having tested
their effectiveness in changing users' behaviours via ad hoc, reliable
experiments, the attention should then turn to consider when and how to
integrate these mechanisms into policy-making (and into real life).
Behavioural science can be applied to public policies whenever
there is a behavioural element to them. It can help design new policies,
suggest improvements to existing ones, or provide ex-post explanations
of why the target group of a specific policy reacted in a particular way. 199
When considering at what stages of policy-making behavioural
insights and its strategies should be introduced, 200 behavioural aspects
should be incorporated (at least) in the following phases of privacy
policy-making:
First of all, at the first stage of the policy design, where policymakers seek to understand users' behaviour surveys on online users'
practices as regards their personal data (e.g., biases explaining privacy
paradox) have been run in several countries as mentioned before and also
in the EU; an example is given in the Special Eurobarometer 359/11 and
related report published by the Eurpoean Commission ("EC") in 2011. 201
Other specific studies are not missing in Europe, like the one on privacyfriendly default settings, carried out within the SPION project. 202
However, in order to test the responses of users to innovative privacy
strategies, field trails, from which policy recommendations may be
drawn, are needed-like those started to be run in the U.S. on privacy

expected to (differently) impact users' disclosive behaviour. Id.
198. At the time of writing, the BREVE experiment is underway: results of which are
expected to be published soon.
199. See Rene van Bavel et al., supra note 136.
200. Id.; see also Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141.
201. See Pan-European Survey of Practices, supra note 18, at 6.
202. See generally Alessandro Acquisti & Fred Stutzman, Behavioral Aspects ofPrivacy
in
Online
Social
Networks,
SPION (Dec.
21,
2012),
available
at
http://www.spion.me/workpackage/behavioral-aspects-of-privacy-in-online-social-networks
(last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
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nudges 203 and visceral notices. 204 These responses are still not enough
explored in Europe and studies like BREVE (where a series of different
privacy notices are tested on EU users) are exceptional. 205
Still at the policy design stage, behavioural insights may be
employed in the context of the Impact Assessment ("IA"), as one of the
pillars of the EC better regulation strategy in different areas of policy
intervention. 206 The IA document accompanying the EC Proposal for a
GDPR makes some reference to behavioural research; however, more
could be done at this level.
As Alemanno & Spina notice, "behavioural considerations may
allow policy makers to not only consider a broader set of regulatory
options and test their effectiveness through Randomized Controlled
Trials ("RCTs"), but also to empower citizens to have a say thus
increasing the accountability of the regulatory outcome. " 207 These
considerations should include testing the policy options (via in field
experiments).
Secondly, at the formal stage of law-making process, transferring
behavioural considerations into primary or secondary law. At this step,
several issues should be considered in future research, such as: should the
law impose stricter requirements for online privacy policies, to be
'visceral' and effective 208 ( e.g., requirements related to the website
architectural design or also on the pursued behavioural change effect)?;
How detailed should the privacy law be in this regard?; Would the
introduction of specific legal requirements for effective privacy policies,
like visceral notices, be feasible and affordable for industry and
consumers?; and Would the visceral privacy notices be better introduced
with soft law instruments (e.g., recommendations), in which evidencebased models of privacy measures might be strongly urged to industry?
Third, at the implementation level:

203. See Acquisti, supra note 182, at 24-25.
204. See Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 15.
205 . Needless to say that experiments of this kind on users' behaviour should be
conducted in compliance with legal and ethical principles, starting from informing the
participants about the purposes of the tests (at least about the general goals and before using
their data). Principles seem to not have been followed by some social networks in their recent
practices. For example, for a week, Facebook members were unwitting participants of an
experiment in direct emotional manipulation. Alex Wilhelm, Facebook and the Ethics of
at
available
2014),
29,
(June
TECHCRUNCH
Manipulation,
User
(last
http://techcrunch.com/2014/06/29/facebook-and-the-ethics-of-user-manipulation/
visited Dec. 20, 2015).
206. Impact Assessment Guidelines, at 4, SEC (2009) 92 final (Jan. 15, 2009).
207. Alemanno & Spina, supra note 141, at 456.
208. See Calo, supra note 115, at 1071-72.
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It would be possible to introduce more innovative privacy notices
through implementing acts of supranational or national legislation, like
implementing acts of the European Commission or European guidelines.
Some good examples already exist but are limited to better information
provisions. 209
Another possible integration of behavioural insights at this level
might be within the specific Data Protection Impact Assessment that any
controller will be required to run according to the Draft GDPR, when
"processing operations present specific risks to the rights and freedoms
of data subjects by virtue of their nature, their scope or their purposes"
(Article 33). 210 The use of behavioural insights might be very useful, as
it would allow to better assess the impact of risky technologies on users'
privacy and their perceptions, as well as the effectiveness of privacyprotecting measures to be adopted by the data controller.
However, this would not be painless. Several issues are at stake.
Should behavioural considerations be imposed by law at this stage?
Furthermore, should, for instance, an ISP conduct his own evaluation
about how the application of privacy nudges on his website may reduce
risks for privacy, impacting on users' behaviour and should he decide
which nudge is more appropriate? Economic considerations may bring
him to choose the less appropriate nudge; although a very informal,
youngish interface may be of negative effect on users' protective
behaviour, it might increase trust in his website and, consequently,
increase personal data disclosure (necessary for its business model). 211
A DP assessment, if any, might be made at a higher level, e.g., by
the EDPS, the European DP Supervisor, or by the national Data
Protection Authorities and for categories of data controllers (e.g., ISPs ).
In this case, visceral notices or other kinds of privacy nudges may
represent valuable options that add to a wider framework of requirements
aimed at obtaining a sort of data protection certification, like privacy
seals, 212 which are encouraged by the Draft GDPR (Article 39).
209. See Luzak, supra note 83, at 549. See also Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 13563
(2011), which promotes increased public participation throughout all stages of the rulemaking
process and encourages public agencies to consider regulatory approaches such as default
rules, disclosure, and simplification that nudge citizens toward better choices while allowing
them to retain flexibility and liberty of choice.
210. Artemi R. Lombarte, The Madrid Resolution and Prospects for Transnational
PIAs, in PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 385,395 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds., 2012).
211. For a critical perspective on privacy nudges see Willis, supra note 144, at 1170-72.
"Nudges may not be an effective way to help people make better choices about information
privacy; accordingly, firms can use the same mechanisms and conditions that make nudges
work to make nudges fail." Id.
212. Final Report of the European Union Privacy Seals Project on the Inventory and
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Finally, behavioural insights could be introduced to evaluate ex post
the goodness of a law (or piece oflaw) to improve people's privacy life:
learn from the experience (how people reacted to a specific public
intervention in the privacy field) and take the consequent policy
decisions.
Having said that, a word of caution is required. While it would be
naive to ignore the effect of biases when setting a privacy policy that
relies on the decisions of people, we should, however, not totally rely on
the effects of biases. First, privacy choices are context-dependent.
Therefore, EU future strategies should consider and possibly guide the
choice of what privacy nudge is better for a specific context (e.g.,
informal, youngish context).
Secondly, as recent behavioural research in the law domain also
teach us, implementing nudging mechanisms might not be enough to
protect online privacy, especially in contexts such as behavioural
targeting by companies: we cannot easily rely on user's behaviour change
when personal data disclosure is the only way to obtaining a service: in
cases such as news programing or webpages targeting kids, 213
prohibitions and a duly control system of certain companies practices are
needed. 214 Recent studies have shown that many companies might not
obey what they promise in their privacy policies or that they do not
respect the users' preference, for instance, not to receive unsolicited
commercial emails. 215 Therefore, there will be always some aspects that
needs coercive regulatory tools.
In other words, privacy visceral notices might not be considered as
a panacea to protect privacy, but complementary tools. Sometimes,
coercive measures are still necessary: ( 1) when personal data is necessary
to obtain a public service; (2) in general, technical processes and
mechanisms specific ofbig data 216 make users unaware of what decisions

Analysis

of
Certification
Schemes ,
at
12
(2013),
available
at
http://www.vub.ac.be/LSTS/pub/Dehert/481.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
213. See Simone van der Hof, No Child's Play: Online Data Protection for Our
Children, in MINDING MINORS WANDERING THE WEB: REGULATING ONLINE CHILD SAFETY
127, 130 (Simone van der Hof et al. eds., 2014).
214. Borgesius, supra note 80, at 5, 46.
215. Some tests with unsolicited commercial emails ("UCE") show that only one out of
three websites respect the will of the data subject not to receive commercial communications.
See Maurizio Borghi et al., Online Data Processing Consent Under EU Law: A Theoretical
Framework and Empirical Evidence From The UK, 21 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 109, 152
(2013) (reporting that their study, conducted on popular UK-based websites, "unveils that the
way in which websites obtain consent (opt-in, pre-selected opt-in, or opt-out) is not a proxy
of lawful processing of data at a later stage").
216. Cukier & Mayer-Schoenberger, supra note 81 , at 6.
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will be taken on the basis of their data; and (3) online companies might
not be compliant with their policies. Even if they advertise their website
as privacy-protective, thus increasing users' trust, their promises to
respect users' privacy preferences might be infringed, without users being
able to realize it. Privacy seals might prove to be an instrument for
competition among companies that, however, centers on privacy image
rather than privacy reality. 217 Moreover, online companies may use the
same mechanisms that make nudges work to make nudges fail, like
reframing the nudges: "a push [back] can easily overwhelm a nudge." 218
Therefore, in order to make sure that tested privacy nudges work as
expected also in real life, public policy should learn the lessons of
behavioural science, being capable to guide and check not only the
creation (design) but also the use of these nudges; it may be necessary to
impose requirements and conditions, not only on the appearance of a
privacy nudge, but on the effects it pursues. Also, for privacy seals to
work and given the difficulty for users to distinguish websites on privacy
grounds, it would be necessary to increase the driving and supervisory
powers of data protection authorities, which can verify the truthfulness of
privacy seals (or other certification model) and strengthen their effect.
1. Future research

Online companies may be non-compliant with data protection law
for different reasons, including the lack of appropriate standard of
information on what the law requires, as well as a lack adequate
supervision mechanisms. 219 On this regard, future research may explore
possibilities for nudging systems to target the companies themselves, i.e.,
to drive them to be compliant with data protection law.
For future research, cyber-security risks (besides and in addition to
those for privacy and data protection) should also be considered.
Accidental or intentional personal data breaches (e.g., as consequence of,
but not limited to, hacking activity), as well as identity thefts (perpetrated,
for instance to commit financial crimes) are still far from being defeated.
However, the security in cyberspace may be benefited and improved

217. Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy by Default?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 64,128
(2014).
218. Id. at 131.
219. Borghi et al. , supra note 215, at 110, 153 (claiming that there is a severe lack of
compliance of UK on line service providers with essential requirements of data protection law
and suggest that this might due to the existence of "an inappropriate standard of
implementation, information and supervision by the UK authorities, rather than of a conscious
infringing behavior." As they notice, "unclear or unexplained law is detrimental to the
development of a safe online environment and, ultimately, to citizens").
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precisely through nudging systems, 220 including the use of privacy and
security nudges. These might take the form of visceral notices, as
described in this text, or of other kinds of nudging mechanisms. 221
Further research should also investigate the long-term impact of visceral
notices and privacy nudges in general and observe users' privacy
behaviours over time. 222
V. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
The behaviourally-informed approach to regulatory problems, in
fact, is gaining momentum, and its instruments, so called nudges, are
becoming authentic policy tools. To what extent behavioural insights can
be applied to policy-making in the field of privacy and how? Building
upon few existing experiments on users' attitudes and behaviour as
regards privacy, this paper aims at bringing behavioural research methods
for privacy to the attention of policymakers, exploring challenges and
opportunities of applying behavioural insights into privacy policymaking, at its different stages: from the design to the implementation
phase.
After having discussed the reasons of the failure of traditional
information notices (privacy policies) and considered the benefits of
applying behavioural insights for regulatory purposes in general (e.g.,
nudging strategies), this article claims that the introduction of privacy
nudges, as complementary regulatory tools can be considered legitimate
and worthy of policy support, also in Europe, as far as: ( 1) they seek at
encouraging a privacy-enhancing behaviour, while preserving the
freedom of choice of the users (rather than hinder it), as soft or libertarian
paternalism claims; 223 and (2) they are adopted in a transparent manner
and subject to oversight mechanisms to guarantee that base legal
principles are respected.
Also, the paper aims to trigger the discussion on the feasibility of
introducing specific legal requirements for effective privacy notices
(whether on a privacy-by-design architecture or also on the purposes to
be pursued, i.e., the behavioural change).
After all, the new Proposal for a European GDPR, 224 seeks to
reinforce the transparency and informed consent requirements in view of

220.
See Work Packages, SPION (Dec. 21,
http://www.spion.me/workpackages/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2015).
221. van der Berg, supra note 108, at 776, 783.
222. Groom & Calo, supra note 25, at 4, 28.
223. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 131, at 5.
224. See Proposal for GDPR, supra note 2.
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strengthening individual rights. Behavioural insights and nudging
systems (as visceral notices) may represent an evolving way of
interpreting and implementing the new Regulation, or a way of testing
the adequacy of its stated safeguards.
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